Reconsidering American strategy in South Asia: destroying terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas

Unleashing the Corporate Dogs of War

“…A statistically meaningless 15 per cent of Pakistanis have a favourable view of the US and the West by association. 44 Full scale incursions designed to repeatedly wither T/AQ redoubts posing a clear and present danger to Western homelands in short sharp offensives is being discounted for fear of damaging a 15 per cent approval rating -85 per cent percent of Pakistan detests the West -the situation can not get much worse. There is little to lose politically and much to gain militarily by conventional incursions into the WBZ.…”

“…10 Of Afghanistan directly, Pakistan's traditional sponsorship of the T/AQ for use not solely as a counter-weight in Afghanistan to Indian artifices but to ensure access to Central Asian energy reserves, create a fallback position in the event of an Indian overrun, provide a training base for state sponsored terrorist cells for use in Kashmir and beyond and as a tool to manage Pashto nationalist discontent within Pakistan, the presumptive picture painted is one of unending Pakistani support for, or at minimum tolerance of, the Taliban and its parasitic co-inhabitant Al-Qaeda. At least for a period farther out than the looming date for the collapse of Western support for the AF/PAK expedition 11 and notwithstanding contemporary offensives in the Swat valley and South Waziristan aimed solely at the Taliban's more introspective wing challenging state control, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 12 Counter-terrorism initiatives waged by the Army of Pakistan in arenas such as the Swat valley and segments of South Waziristan are aimed at the TTP in isolation, purposefully leaving the larger 'Afghan' Taliban unharrassed.…”

“…Australia is the second largest overseas military training provider in this respect, regarding the education of Pakistani military officers -140 places at Australian military training establishments. 6 An additional team of 100-500 US military trainers and operators either working independently on covert 'Direct-Action' missions or seconded to the Pakistan Army as predominantly Special Forces trainers constitute the scope of internal military training assistance packets, 7 patiently awaiting the trickle down effect from there. Problematically, Fair and Chalk comment that this approach is unlikely to pay dividends and transform chaos to calm given the riven state of Pakistan's internal affairs, be it within the civil, military or intelligence establishments.…”

The Artful Dodger: On Pakistan, Reality Bites

“…It creates a fall-back position in the event of an Indian overrun, a training base for state-sponsored terrorist cells for use in Kashmir and beyond, and as a tool to manage Pashto-nationalist discontent within Pakistan. 22 The overall picture is one of unending Pakistani support for, or at minimum tolerance of, the Taliban and its parasitic collaborator, al-Qaeda, at least for a period beyond the projected date for the withdrawal of Western support for AF/PAK operations.…”

“…8 In support, there is a team of between 100 and 500 US military trainers and operators working either independently on covert "Direct-Action" missions, or seconded to the Pakistani Army as primarily Special Forces instructors who provide internal military training assistance packets and then patiently wait for a subsequent "trickle down" effect. 9 Fair and Chalk, however, comment that this approach is unlikely to pay dividends and transform chaos to calm, given the state of Pakistan's internal affairs, be they within or between its civil, military or intelligence establishments. 10 Aside from the political obstacles within Pakistan that prevent the neutralization of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, this approach is both idealistic and impractical.…”