Rebellion Versus Loyalty, Shirking Versus Working: A Note on Framing Parliamentary Behaviour

Abstract

In this research note we utilise online survey experiments to test framing effects on evaluations of elected politicians' behaviour. We find that responses to descriptions of hypothetical British Members of Parliaments' behaviour are influenced by negativity bias; logically equivalent behaviours have variable impacts on evaluations depending on their presentation. In an era of open data, where institutions are increasingly packaging up information about representatives for citizens' consumption, these findings are a reminder that seemingly neutral variations in presentation may alter public reactions.

Parliamentary Representation: Should MPs Prioritise Their Own Views or Those of Their Voters?

“…On the other hand, politicians are increasingly willing to not ‘toe the party line’ on big issues. While it is true that the Westminster system has tended to produce strong party cohesion and discipline (Campbell and Cowley, 2014; Slapin et al, 2018), British MPs seem to have become more rebellious over time, as we saw with Tony Blair’s welfare reforms or David Cameron’s introduction of same-sex marriage (e.g. Cowley, 2002; Cowley and Stuart, 2010; Heppell et al, 2017).…”

Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2015

“…Tolerated and calculated paired absence, or the possibility to be paired and find a pair, would be a function of expected division related features. In addition, our findings offer a fertile ground for further exploiting variation in the use of absence in two areas: individual MP learning behavior throughout ones career in how to adequately use these absence or how to correct for them if necessary, but also in close relationship to the rebellion literature (Campbell and Cowley 2014;Wagner, Vivyan, and Glinitzer 2020), discussing avenues for communicating and motivating absences towards interested and impacted stakeholders.…”

Voter reaction to legislator dissent across political systems

“…However, research from the United States and United Kingdom shows that voters see legislators who display loyalty to their party as career-oriented and dishonest and reward those who dissent from the party line (Johnson & Rosenblatt, 2007;Carson et al, 2010;Campbell & Cowley, 2014;Koger & Lebo, 2017;Bøggild, 2020). Such voter preferences create incentives for legislators to follow their constituency at the expense of party policy.…”

“…Theoretically, we identify two competing theoretical expectations regarding the effect of legislator dissent across political systems in the literature. First, legislator dissent is argued to signal integrity (Carson et al, 2010;Campbell & Cowley, 2014), which all voters should appreciate and which ought to lead to similar effects across political systems. Second, legislator dissent is argued to signal loyalty to constituency over party, which may be more valuable to voters in single-member district systems where the legislator-constituency connection is more salient (Cain et al, 1987;Lancaster, 1986;Searing, 1988), resulting in a stronger impact of legislator dissent among voters in single-member district systems.…”