Reasoning, cognitive control, and moral intuition

Abstract

Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based on conscious deliberation or any significant chain of inference), and that the reasons we produce to explain or justify our judgments and actions are for the most part post hoc rationalizations rather than the actual source of those judgments. This is consistent with work on judgment and explanation in other domains, and it correctly challenges one-sidedly rationalistic accounts. We suggest that in fact reasoning has a great deal of influence on moral judgments and on intuitive judgments in general. This influence is not apparent from study of judgments simply in their immediate context, but it is crucial for the question of how cognition can help us avoid deleterious effects and enhance potentially beneficial effects of affect on judgment, action, and cognition itself. We begin with established work on several reactive strategies for cognitive control of affect (e.g., suppression, reappraisal), then give special attention to more complex sorts of conflict (“extended deliberation”) involving multiple interacting factors, both affective and reflective. These situations are especially difficult to study in a controlled way, but we propose some possible experimental approaches. We then review proactive strategies for control, including avoidance of temptation and mindfulness meditation (Froeliger et al., 2012, this issue). We give special attention to the role of slow or “cool” cognitive processes (e.g., deliberation, planning, and executive control) in the inculcation of long-term dispositions, traits, intuitions, skills, or habits. The latter are critical because they in turn give rise to a great many of our fast, intuitive judgments. The reasoning processes involved here are distinct from post hoc rationalizations and have a very real impact on countless intuitive judgments in concrete situations. This calls for a substantial enlargement of research on cognitive control, drawing on work in developmental psychology, automatization, educational theory, and other fields.

Altered moral decision-making in patients with idiopathic Parkinson's disease

“…The correlations in our HC participants are in line with other studies, which discuss the relation of MDM to reasoning, planning and empathy [3,5]. Unexpectedly, a relationship between ToM and MDM was missing, which is discussed controversially [4,25] and needs clarification in future studies.…”

“…One could argue that PD patients´ cognitive dysfunctions directly lead to MDM alterations, as executive functions have been related to moral decisions against intuitive affective responses [2,3]. However, this explanation seems unlikely, as deteriorated functions in our PD patient group were unrelated to MDM.…”

“…All participants were examined with established tests assessing reasoning (LPS subtest four) and executive functions (the MCST for conceptual set-shifting, the Key Search Test for planning and the TMT for attentional set-shifting were chosen to represent MDM-relevant executive functions [3,18] …”

“…Moral decision-making (MDM) regulates social conduct [1] and is related to executive control [2,3], theory of mind (ToM; i.e. the ability to infer other people's mental states) [4], and empathy [5] (i.e.…”

Business Ethics: The Promise of Neuroscience

“…Individuals have developed a myriad of ways to frame issues and deceive themselves such that the ethical dimension is absent from a business decision, including rationalizations (Patterson et al, 2012) and unconscious biases (Heinzelmann et al, 2012). Additionally lessons from neuroscience and social perspective taking, empathy, theory of mind (Lieberman 2007), and intuition (Haidt, 2001) can play a role in designing curriculum that enhances students' ability to analyze ethical issues and to refine their own thinking about these issues.…”