Reasoning and logic

Mackenzie, Jim

doi:10.1007/bf00873257

Cited by 33 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In contrast, in a dialogical setting such as the one described here, Opponent must take a stance only with respect to the small, and in any case finite, number of sentences explicitly put forward by Proponent. (Mackenzie (, 104) makes a similar point.) One might think that the requirement of logical omniscience remains a problem, but here again the fact that C is put forward by an agent with equally limited cognitive resources alleviates this worry at least to some extent (again, something noted by Mackenzie (Ib., 105)).…”

Section: Back To the Normativity Of Logicmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Recently, a number of authors (e.g., Easwaran and Fitelson ) have been arguing that deductive consistency is not a reasonable requirement for ideal epistemic rationality (precisely on the basis of paradoxes of consistency such as the preface paradox) . In contrast, a stronger case can arguably be made for the plausibility of deductive consistency as a norm within discursive, dialogical contexts; indeed, it can be argued that consistency (as embodied by the principle of non‐contraction) is originally and fundamentally a discursive, dialogical principle rather than an epistemic one (Mackenzie ). And if this is right, then a dialogical version of the preface paradox will be much less cogent than the epistemic version.…”

Section: Back To the Normativity Of Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, what exactly are the phenomena falling under the normative grip of logic? ‘Reasoning’ is an ambiguous term, as it can pertain both to multi‐agent, linguistic, social situations of argumentation (‘You can't reason with her!’), and to inner mental processes of thinking (Mackenzie , 100). However, in recent debates, the focus has been almost exclusively on the normativity of logic specifically for thought , i.e., mono‐agent mental processes regulating beliefs .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Dialogical, Multi-Agent Account of the Normativity of Logic

Novaes

2015

Dialectica

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The paper argues that much of the difficulty with making progress on the issue of the normativity of logic for thought, as discussed in the literature, stems from a misapprehension of what logic is normative for. The claim is that, rather than mono‐agent mental processes, (deductive) logic in fact comprises norms for quite specific situations of multi‐agent dialogical interactions, in particular special forms of debates. This reconceptualization is inspired by historical developments in logic and mathematics (briefly surveyed in the paper), in particular the pervasiveness of such dialogical conceptions in the early days of logic in ancient Greece. The multi‐agent, dialogical perspective then allows for the formulation of compelling 'bridge principles’ between the relation of logical consequence and dialogical normative principles, something that is notoriously difficult to achieve in a mono‐agent setting pertaining exclusively to thought and belief. The upshot is also that the truth‐preserving rules of logic generally do not have a primary normative bearing on mono‐agent mental processes, and in this sense the paper sides with Harman's (1986; 2009) critique of the idea that logic has a normative import for thought and belief.

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Section: Back To the Normativity Of Logicmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Back To the Normativity Of Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Dialogical, Multi-Agent Account of the Normativity of Logic

Novaes

2015

Dialectica

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“…(Billig, 1996, p. 2;emphasis in original) This sounds familiar enough to rhetoricians and dialecticians who approach argumentation as a communicative process, procedure or transaction (Wenzel, 1990;Goodwin, 2005). It's also not uncommon among dialogically minded formal logicians (Dutilh Novaes, 2015;Krabbe, 2013;MacKenzie, 1989). As it turns out, mutual relations between argumentative discussion and solo reasoning might be more pervasive than officially affirmed (Lewiński, in press).…”

Section: Solo Reasoning Vs Collective Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Argumentation as Reasoned Advocacy

Lewiński

2017

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Abstract:The paper offers a theoretical investigation into the sources of normativity in practical argumentation. The chief question is: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on "good" argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I address this question by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties, and by discussing the tenets of a comparative approach to practical reason. I argue that given the comparative structure proposed, reasoned advocacy in argumentative activity upholds reasonableness whenever that activity is adequately designed. I propose some basic rules for such a design of practical argumentation.Résumé: Cet article offre un examen théorique des sources de normativité dans l'argumentation pratique. La question principale qui nous occupe est la suivante: avons-nous besoin d'argumentateurs objectifs et non-biaisés ou pouvons-nous compter sur de "bons" processus argumentatifs susceptibles de neutraliser les biais individuels? Je traite d'abord cette question à travers une analyse de la structure détaillée de l'argumentation pratique et de ses variétés et ensuite par une discussion des fondements d'une approche comparative de la raison pratique. Je défends l'idée que selon la structure comparative proposée, tout plaidoyer raisonné dans une activité argumentative maintient la raisonnabilité tant que cette activité est conçue de manière appropriée. Je propose quelques règles de base pour une telle conception de l'argumentation pratique.

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“…Curiously, Brandom (2002, p. 50) attributes it to Harman (1984); cf. Mackenzie (1989). 5 Exceptions are those cases in which someone talks without any attention to whether what is said is true or false.…”

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confidence: 96%