Practical Argumentation as Reasoned Advocacy

Abstract

Abstract:The paper offers a theoretical investigation into the sources of normativity in practical argumentation. The chief question is: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on "good" argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I address this question by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties, and by discussing the tenets of a comparative approach to practical reason. I argue that given the comparative structure proposed, reasoned advocacy in argumentative activity upholds reasonableness whenever that activity is adequately designed. I propose some basic rules for such a design of practical argumentation.Résumé: Cet article offre un examen théorique des sources de normativité dans l'argumentation pratique. La question principale qui nous occupe est la suivante: avons-nous besoin d'argumentateurs objectifs et non-biaisés ou pouvons-nous compter sur de "bons" processus argumentatifs susceptibles de neutraliser les biais individuels? Je traite d'abord cette question à travers une analyse de la structure détaillée de l'argumentation pratique et de ses variétés et ensuite par une discussion des fondements d'une approche comparative de la raison pratique. Je défends l'idée que selon la structure comparative proposée, tout plaidoyer raisonné dans une activité argumentative maintient la raisonnabilité tant que cette activité est conçue de manière appropriée. Je propose quelques règles de base pour une telle conception de l'argumentation pratique.

Conclusions of Practical Argument: A Speech Act Analysis

“…As such, "[a]n examination of practical discourse may be expected to make clear the actual criteria used in appraising practical arguments, and hence in establishing practical judgements" (Gauthier 1963, 50). Practical discourse (practical argumentation, deliberative practices) is thus not only a display mechanism for inner practical reasoning but also an important entry point into the elements and standards of practical reasoning (Lewiński 2017). 3 Gauthier's central idea is fairly straightforward:…”

“…8 One main consequence of it is a shift of focus away from the internal propositional attitude of intention to some externalised and collective speech act, notably, that of proposal. 9 Accordingly, the analyses of proposals have attracted some attention-especially in argumentation theory 8 See (Lewiński 2017;2019), (Corredor 2020), (Dascal 2005), (Green 2017), and (Walton 2006;. While some authors claim that this connection is a sign that "Aristotle has confused the psychological process by which a person comes to resolve a practical problem with the logical argument in which the steps leading to the resolution are formally set out" (Gauthier 1963, 26;cf.…”

“…While some authors claim that this connection is a sign that "Aristotle has confused the psychological process by which a person comes to resolve a practical problem with the logical argument in which the steps leading to the resolution are formally set out" (Gauthier 1963, 26;cf. Chang, 2016), others argue this might have been a deliberate choice in Aristotle's conception, where the process of deliberation is constitutive of practical reason, and thus in-principle social and open to the back-and-forth of argumentation (Lewiński 2017;2019;Dascal 2005). 9 Notice, though, that Broome, somewhat inconsistently, also speaks of speech acts which the reasoner performs to herself: "the speech-act you perform is the act of expressing an attitude of yours" (Broome 2013, 253).…”

Argumentation and Persistent Disagreement

“…A client asks them to construct a building. Bob argues that it is a bad idea 19 According to Lewiński (2017), however, we can also understand deliberation as a role-based exchange of reasons. In such cases, the parties do hold clashing commitments for which they advocate during the deliberation process; thus, deliberation does not only occur when there is an open problem but also when there is a practical disagreement.…”

“…As I will argue in the following section, such confusion of dialogue types is not problematic for the main argument of this paper, but quite the opposite. 20 Or, in Lewiński's (2017) model, the parties do not even need to suspend their judgement but merely take advocacy roles for or against the courses of action suggested.…”