Realization Relations in Metaphysics

Baysan, Umut

doi:10.1007/s11023-015-9366-x

Cited by 26 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Realization is a relation that holds between higher-level properties and lower-level properties (Baysan (2015); Wilson and Craver (2006)). According to a popular line of thought in philosophy of mind, psychological states or properties such as believing that it is raining, having a taste for anchovies or having a pain are realized by physical states.…”

Section: The Multiple Realization Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

Michel¹

2018

Philos Stud

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Opponents to consciousness in fish argue that fish do not feel pain because they do not have a neocortex, which is a necessary condition for feeling pain. A common counter-argument appeals to the multiple realizability of pain: while a neocortex might be necessary for feeling pain in humans, pain might be realized differently in fish. This paper argues, first, that it is impossible to find a criterion allowing us to demarcate between plausible and implausible cases of multiple realization of pain without running into a circular argument. Second, opponents to consciousness in fish cannot be provided with reasons to believe in the multiple realizability of pain. I conclude that the debate on the existence of pain in fish is impossible to settle by relying on the multiple realization argument.

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Section: The Multiple Realization Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

Michel¹

2018

Philos Stud

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“…Wilson (2017) and Wasserman (2015), respectively. For an overview of the literature on functional and mereological realization, see Baysan (2015). (For realization aficionados, I'm open to the idea that there are still other forms of realization, such as subset realization as characterized by Wilson (1999) and others, and that these likewise count as metaphysical determination relations in my sense.)…”

Section: Grounding Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding-mechanical explanation

Trogdon

2017

Philos Stud

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I argue that there is an important similarity between causation and grounding. In particular I argue that, just as there is a type of scientific explanation that appeals to causal mechanisms-causal-mechanical explanation-there is a type of metaphysical explanation that appeals to grounding mechanisms-grounding-mechanical explanation. The upshot is that the role that grounding mechanisms play in certain metaphysical explanations mirrors the role that causal mechanisms play in certain scientific explanations. In this light, it becomes clear that grounding-mechanical explanations make crucial contributions to the evaluation of a variety of important philosophical theses, including priority monism and physicalism.

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“…On this understanding, if physicalism is true, insofar as x is a bearer of a physical realizer of a mental property M, there isn't anything that needs to be added to the intrinsic properties of x to make it the case that x has M. Thanks to taking realization as a metaphysical necessitation relation, we can easily distinguish a realization-based version of non-reductive physicalism from some non-physicalist views which also hold that mental property instances are brought about by physical property instances where such bringing-about holds only contingently.2 It 1 See Baysan (2015) for discussion of different accounts of realization.…”

Section: ***mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 See Horgan (1982), Lewis (1983), Kim (1984). 6 See Morris (2010), Gibb (2014) and Baysan (2015) for related discussion. 7 See Baysan (2016, 386).…”

Section: ***mentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Baysan

2017

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as "the subset view" of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers. ***Non-reductive physicalism is typically understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. What counts as a case of realization is widely disputed.1 According to a commonly-held view, realization is a relation between two properties, the realizer property P and the realized property Q, whereby something's having P somehow brings about its having Q. Surely, "brings about the instantiation of" is a predicate that can pick out many relations. What is distinctive about realization, according to the standard picture, is that such bringing-about is supposed to hold non-contingently and synchronically: If P realizes Q, then, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, if x is a bearer of P at a time t, then x is also a bearer of Q at t.On this understanding, if physicalism is true, insofar as x is a bearer of a physical realizer of a mental property M, there isn't anything that needs to be added to the intrinsic properties of x to make it the case that x has M. Thanks to taking realization as a metaphysical necessitation relation, we can easily distinguish a realization-based version of non-reductive physicalism from some non-physicalist views which also hold that mental property instances are brought about by physical property instances where such bringing-about holds only contingently.2 It 1 See Baysan (2015) for discussion of different accounts of realization.2 Noordhof (2003) persuasively argues for a related claim. As an example of such non-physicalist views, consider the view that phenomenal mental properties supervene nomologically, but not metaphysically, on physical properties (Chalmers 1996).

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Realization Relations in Metaphysics

Cited by 26 publications

References 45 publications

Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

Grounding-mechanical explanation

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

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