Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

Michel, Matthias

doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1133-4

Cited by 27 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 84 publications

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“…“Can fish feel pain?” is an ongoing debate among researchers as many have claimed that fish do have sensation of pain while others disagree [ 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 ]. For the sake of animal welfare, it is wise to err on the safe side such that the use of anesthetics in fish experiments, especially for invasive procedures, is encouraged whenever applicable [ 1 , 2 ].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determination of Optimal Doses and Minimum Effective Concentrations of Tricaine Methanesulfonate, 2-Phenoxyethanol and Eugenol for Laboratory Managements in Nile Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus)

Rairat

Chen

Hsieh

et al. 2021

Animals

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Anesthetic agents are often used in fish experiments to reduce the stress and struggle and to improve animal welfare. The present study aimed to determine the optimal doses and serum minimum effective concentration (MEC) of tricaine methanesulfonate (MS-222), 2-phenoxyethanol (2-PE), and eugenol (EUG) in Nile tilapia. Twenty-one fish were immersed in three different doses of each anesthetic and the minimal dose that produce stage III anesthesia within 5 min, maintain anesthesia status for 3 min, and recover within 5 min was considered the optimal dose. The serum concentrations of anesthetics immediately after the fish reached stage III anesthesia was defined as the MEC. The results revealed that the anesthetics dose-dependently shorten the induction time while the effect of doses on the recovery times were variable. The determined optimal doses for MS-222, 2-PE, and EUG were 300, 900, and 90 ppm, respectively. The MECs were 70, 263, and 53 µg/mL, respectively, about two to four times lower than the optimal doses and were independent of the doses. After immersion stopped, the serum concentrations decreased by >90% within the first hour and >99% after 4 h. Our research provides useful information for a smooth fish handling and design for researches requiring stage III anesthesia.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determination of Optimal Doses and Minimum Effective Concentrations of Tricaine Methanesulfonate, 2-Phenoxyethanol and Eugenol for Laboratory Managements in Nile Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus)

Rairat

Chen

Hsieh

et al. 2021

Animals

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“…But if you think the absence of verbal report precludes any scientific investigation of animal consciousness, you should be prepared to say the same about consciousness in preverbal infants and patients in a minimally conscious state. Animal consciousness research rests on the idea that, by synthesising the insights and methods of multiple disciplines, and by identifying a battery of behavioural, cognitive, and neuronal criteria for attributing conscious states, these challenges may be overcome.Are Some Animals 'More Conscious' Than Others?At present, the field is young and beset by foundational controversy: controversy about the criteria for consciousness and the methods for studying those criteria [3][4][5][6][7]. At the heart of these debates lies a conceptual question: How can we make sense of variation in consciousness across the animal kingdom?…”

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confidence: 99%

Dimensions of Animal Consciousness

Birch

Schnell

Clayton

2020

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

186

137

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How does consciousness vary across the animal kingdom? Are some animals ‘more conscious’ than others? This article presents a multidimensional framework for understanding interspecies variation in states of consciousness. The framework distinguishes five key dimensions of variation: perceptual richness, evaluative richness, integration at a time, integration across time, and selfconsciousness. For each dimension, existing experiments that bear on it are reviewed and future experiments are suggested. By assessing a given species against each dimension, we can construct a consciousness profile for that species. On this framework, there is no single scale along which species can be ranked as more or less conscious. Rather, each species has its own distinctive consciousness profile.

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“…It is important not to underestimate the role that the multiple realizability assumption plays in blocking absence of evidence arguments in the animal consciousness debate. When challenged to explain how a creature is able to feel pain when it lacks the neural architecture responsible for pain in humans, scientists and philosophers alike often defer to the concept of multiple realizability (Demski 2013;Sneddon 2015;Broom 2016;Brown 2016a;Merker 2016;Seth 2016;Striedter 2016;Woodruff 2017Woodruff , 2018Michel 2019). Pain, it is said, is a function and functions are essentially multiply realizable (Putnam 1967).…”

Section: Addressing Multiple Realizability At the Correct Level Of Abstractionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is absence of evidence of pain ever evidence of absence?

Brown

Key

2021

Synthese

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Absence of evidence arguments are indispensable to comparative neurobiology. The absence in a given species of a homologous neural architecture strongly correlated with a type of conscious experience in humans should be able to be taken as a prima facie reason for concluding that the species in question does not have the capacity for that conscious experience. Absence of evidence reasoning is, however, widely disparaged for being both logically illicit and unscientific. This paper argues that these concerns are unwarranted. There is no logical barrier to formulating cogent absence of evidence arguments; indeed, accepting such arguments is part of what it is to be committed to falsifiability as a critical aspect of the scientific method. Absence of evidence arguments can always be blocked, however, by assuming that psychological properties are ‘multiply realizable’. While we take multiple realizability to be highly likely at some level of analysis, we argue that it is question-begging to assume that it exists at every level of analysis, and thus it should not automatically be thought to undermine absence of evidence reasoning in the animal consciousness debate. Using the example of pain and focusing on homologies at the level of information processing tasks, we show how, in the science of consciousness, an absence of evidence might well serve as evidence of absence.

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Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

Cited by 27 publications

References 84 publications

Determination of Optimal Doses and Minimum Effective Concentrations of Tricaine Methanesulfonate, 2-Phenoxyethanol and Eugenol for Laboratory Managements in Nile Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus)

Determination of Optimal Doses and Minimum Effective Concentrations of Tricaine Methanesulfonate, 2-Phenoxyethanol and Eugenol for Laboratory Managements in Nile Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus)

Dimensions of Animal Consciousness

Is absence of evidence of pain ever evidence of absence?

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