Realization and Mental Causation

Shoemaker, Sydney

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570797.005

Cited by 170 publications

(133 citation statements)

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“…See in particular Wilson (2011). Wilson is clear from the outset that her theory doesn't require a commitment to functionalism, and points to this feature as an advantage over Shoemaker's (2001) position. a sufficient condition for physical acceptability and accept that it offers a limited form of causal novelty.…”

Section: Functional Versus Qualitative Realizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 Defenders of the layered model typically accept the causal inheritance principle, and argue that despite not bestowing novel powers, special science properties nonetheless exhibit enough causal novelty to be non-redundant, and enough causal unity to be nomic. According to the proper subset strategy, for instance, realized properties inherit their causal powers, but inherit only some of the powers of their realizers, which allows for both nomic unity and a limited form of causal novelty (Wilson 1999;Shoemaker 2001). 4 Such strategies promise the kind of causal-explanatory novelty required for special science autonomy without novel causal powers, but whether or not they deliver is a matter of considerable controversy.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Demystifying Emergence

Yates¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that's no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it's natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized properties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal-functional accounts of realization and embrace a broader account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H 2 O-a qualitative, multiply realizable property-plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery.A ccording to the layered model, our world is naturally divided into a hierarchy of levels, with basic physics at the bottom. Although higher-level properties and particulars are ultimately dependent upon and determined by basic physics, they are the subject matter of autonomous sciences. What does the autonomy of the so-called special sciences-chemistry, biology, neuroscience, psychology-consist in? According to a longstanding tradition, special science autonomy requires that the relevant higher-level properties feature in laws that

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Section: Functional Versus Qualitative Realizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Demystifying Emergence

Yates¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…One way to ensure this is to take the realization relation itself to illuminate how a realized property is metaphysically necessitated by its realizer. I take these to support the following methodological claim: a good theory of realization should provide the resources to explain how the instantiation of a realizer property metaphysically necessitates the instantiation of a property it realizes.6 In what follows, I will examine what is sometimes called "the subset view" of realization (Wilson 1999(Wilson , 2011Shoemaker 2001; with this theoretical constraint in the background. In other words, I will examine whether the subset view has the resources to explain how realized properties are metaphysically necessitated by their realizers.…”

Section: ***mentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Baysan

2017

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as "the subset view" of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers. ***Non-reductive physicalism is typically understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. What counts as a case of realization is widely disputed.1 According to a commonly-held view, realization is a relation between two properties, the realizer property P and the realized property Q, whereby something's having P somehow brings about its having Q. Surely, "brings about the instantiation of" is a predicate that can pick out many relations. What is distinctive about realization, according to the standard picture, is that such bringing-about is supposed to hold non-contingently and synchronically: If P realizes Q, then, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, if x is a bearer of P at a time t, then x is also a bearer of Q at t.On this understanding, if physicalism is true, insofar as x is a bearer of a physical realizer of a mental property M, there isn't anything that needs to be added to the intrinsic properties of x to make it the case that x has M. Thanks to taking realization as a metaphysical necessitation relation, we can easily distinguish a realization-based version of non-reductive physicalism from some non-physicalist views which also hold that mental property instances are brought about by physical property instances where such bringing-about holds only contingently.2 It 1 See Baysan (2015) for discussion of different accounts of realization.2 Noordhof (2003) persuasively argues for a related claim. As an example of such non-physicalist views, consider the view that phenomenal mental properties supervene nomologically, but not metaphysically, on physical properties (Chalmers 1996).

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“…Many non-reductive physicalists think that a theory of realization should also provide the resources to deal with this problem (e.g. Shoemaker 2001;Wilson 1999).…”

Section: Some Theoretical Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Realization Relations in Metaphysics

Baysan

2015

Minds & Machines

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Realization and Mental Causation

Cited by 170 publications

References 0 publications

Demystifying Emergence

Demystifying Emergence

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Realization Relations in Metaphysics

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