Reality and Its Dreams

Being realistic about neoliberalism

“…The reasons for the success of “normative approaches” include the failure of the movements for political, social, and economic change of the 1960s, and the especial suitability of normativism as an ideology for the established economic and political structures that, after the challenges of the 1960s, were able to entrench themselves even more firmly than before. (Geuss, , p. ix)…”

“…Geuss describes this understanding of desire as one of three parts of a “speculative ethical and political thesis about the nature of the good life and human,” of which the other two parts are a conception of individual freedom and a conception of welfare as access to goods and services. On this model, the good life is one in which the individual is free to fulfill her desires (her “strongest” desires) in the free choice among goods and services provided by a market that responds to those desires in the aggregate (Geuss, , p. 154). This tripartite thesis about desire, freedom, and the good life is supported by the political economy that it in turn justifies; and both are implicated in the chaos and misery they have unleashed .…”

“…If we stay with this, the world as we know it will pretty clearly suffocate on its own toxic by‐products within the foreseeable future. (Geuss, , pp. 144–145, 146)…”

“…49, 21). Geuss himself describes neoliberalism as a “large‐scale theory” comparable to Christianity, positivism, Marxism, and liberalism, and notes that such theories or “worldviews” “usually have sufficiently open texture and are sufficiently robust to be able to accommodate significant changes, even the refutation of some of their component parts, while maintaining their identity” (Geuss, , pp. 91–92) .…”

Norge, USA og det liberale verdifellesskapet

“…Når moralen knyttes til et opphøyd ahistorisk «gode», med et tilsvarende onde i motsetning, forsvinner også mye av muligheten for de uten definisjonsmakt til å motsette seg moraliseringen. Det er dessuten svaert få kontekster hvor kollektiv handling Á som på vegne av en stat Á kan vurderes ut ifra rene moralske prinsipper alene (Geuss 2016). Dette betyr ikke at man ikke kan argumentere for f.eks.…”