Re-assertion of Elite Control in Masoka’s Wildlife Program, Zimbabwe

Abstract

Local level governance is crucial in delivering benefits of conservation to communities. This paper provides a historical review of the evolution of governance and the emergence of elite capture in Masoka's wildlife program in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2011. Fifty-four key informant interviews and reviews of numerous secondary data sources analyzed in order to understand accountability mechanisms, collective decision-making, and the allocation of wildlife revenues into various local initiatives. The local narratives and secondary data suggested that the governance had flipped from one of impersonal and democratic rule to one based on personal rule of traditional leaders. These outcomes were in part a result of the shift in meso level structures that previously supported the program structures at community level, the shifting national politics that led to increased sense of enfranchisement and impunity among traditional leaders, and non-merit based system of appointing committee members. The results suggest that locally elected committees when left at the peril of strong and unchecked powers of traditional leaders they are bound to collapse. Second, the findings also indicate that in the absence of weak land tenure rights, locals have no "teeth" to challenge tradition-based authorities in order to demand for accountable governance. We conclude that given such condition of weak tenure and access to resource rights, local democratic institutions do not emerge naturally even if most people want them and if not protected from outside, they are bound to fail and superseded by personalized ones.

An assessment of human–wildlife conflicts in local communities bordering Chewore and Dande Safari areas in Mbire District, northern Zimbabwe

“…The foregoing was complicated by the fact that the day-today running of the CAMPFIRE programme had evolved into one that precluded ordinary members from meaningful participation. have also been reported in other studies (Balint & Mashinya, 2006;Mapedza & Bond, 2006;Matema & Andersson, 2015;Muyengwa & Child, 2017). Lack of participatory decision-making related to CAMPFIRE has also been reported in other studies (Balint & Mashinya, 2006;Gandiwa et al, 2013;Mapedza & Bond, 2006).…”

Local community benefits from elephants: Can willingness to support anti‐poaching efforts be strengthened?

“…In a country facing the serious challenge of high unemployment rates in the post‐independence era (Mujeyi & Sadomba, 2019), any form of employment will become significant for peoples' livelihoods. Like in many other CAMPFIRE areas, some of the proceeds are used to pay for underprivileged children's school fees (Muyengwa & Child, 2017).…”

“…More often, elite capture excludes communities from decision‐making process. For instance, communities in Masoka noted that they were only notified of how the funds had been used, extremely excluded from budgeting process (Muyengwa & Child, 2017). Moreover, the findings from Masoka show that political and traditional leaders felt superior over local communities and made the CAMPFIRE their own personal project and they overruled any decision made by the local communities (Dube, 2019; Muyengwa & Child, 2017).…”

“…For instance, communities in Masoka noted that they were only notified of how the funds had been used, extremely excluded from budgeting process (Muyengwa & Child, 2017). Moreover, the findings from Masoka show that political and traditional leaders felt superior over local communities and made the CAMPFIRE their own personal project and they overruled any decision made by the local communities (Dube, 2019; Muyengwa & Child, 2017). Moreover, local communities felt disempowered to challenge traditional leaders as they threatened to evict them from land (Muyengwa & Child, 2017).…”

“…The unequal spread of benefits from wildlife can threaten conservation efforts (Biggs et al, 2017). Unequal distribution of CAMPFIRE benefits due to elitism in Masoka, Zimbabwe created rifts within the community which derailed its success (Muyengwa & Child, 2017). More often, elite capture excludes communities from decision-making process.…”