Rational Moral Ignorance

Abstract

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view be er accords with intuitions about cases, the la er one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems be er able to render moral requirements 'followable' or 'action-guiding.' But this tempting thought proves difficult to justify. Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions.

Epistemic akrasia: No apology required

“…See, e.g.,Coates (2012),Horowitz (2014),Sliwa & Horowitz (2015),Christensen (2016Christensen ( , 2021a,Weatherson (2019),Kappel (2019), Lasonen-Aarnio (2020),Barnett (2021),Hawthorne, et. al, (2021).8 The example in this section is adapted fromChristensen (2016Christensen ( , 2021a.…”

“…This is not to say, of course, that Berto needs to consciously think explicitly about the accuracy of his belief about Argument 1. It's just to say that, given the theory of rationality he believes, the irrationality of this belief would not indicate inaccuracy, so his confidence that his belief is irrational does not defeat his belief by suggesting that it is inaccurate.12 This example is taken from Christensen (2021a), which adapted it fromBarnett (2021). Lasonen-Aarnio (2020, 613) gives a schematic example where an agent's evidence favors belief in a false epistemological theory, in order to argue that there are cases where evidence will support an akratic pair of beliefs.Weatherson (2019, 170ff) offers a concrete example in this vein, though it differs in a respect I'll discuss below Hawthorne, et al (2021).…”

“…This is not to say, of course, that Berto needs to consciously think explicitly about the accuracy of his belief about Argument 1. It's just to say that, given the theory of rationality he believes, the irrationality of this belief would not indicate inaccuracy, so his confidence that his belief is irrational does not defeat his belief by suggesting that it is inaccurate.11 This example is taken fromChristensen (2021a), which adapted it fromBarnett (2021).Lasonen-Aarnio (2020, 613) gives…”