We all live out our lives in states of epistemic imperfection. Most obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited. Only a little less obviously, we live in states of epistemic imperfection because we do not always respond to the evidence we have in the best way. Given that our epistemic condition consists in imperfect responses to incomplete evidence, part of being rational involves taking account of these sources of imperfection.Fortunately, each of us is confronted every day by opportunities for epistemic self-improvement. Most frequently, opportunity arrives in the form of evidence that bears directly on the subject matters of our beliefs: hearing the evening weather report, I can revise upward my confi dence that it will rain tomorrow. Other opportunities for epistemic self-improvement address, not our defi cits in evidence, but our defi cits in responding to the evidence: reading a study showing that professors vastly overrate their teaching abilities, I can revise downward (at least temporarily) 1 my confi dence that I'm a dynamite teacher.One fairly common situation that may present opportunities for improvement is that of discovering that another person's belief on a given This essay was read in fall 2004 at Princeton University, and I'd like to thank the audience at that talk for stimulating discussion. I'd also like to thank the following people for helpful discussions of this material or comments on earlier drafts:
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps ‘epistemic peers’ who seem as well‐qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions that thinking about this issue raises.
Are rational beliefs constrained by formal logic? This book argues that if beliefs are seen in a binary way (either one believes a proposition or one doesn't), then the standard constraints of ’deductive cogency’ (i.e. deductive consistency and deductive closure) are incompatible with epistemic rationality. If, however, beliefs are seen as graded, or coming in degrees, a probabilistic constraint (based on standard logic) is imposed by ideal rationality. This constraint, probabilistic coherence, explains both the appeal of the standard deductive constraints and the power of deductive arguments. Moreover, it can be defended without taking degrees of belief (as many decision-theoretic philosophers have) to be somehow defined or constituted by preferences. Although probabilistic coherence is humanly unattainable, this does not undermine its normative status as a constraint in a suitably idealized understanding of epistemic rationality.
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