Rational-Experiential Inventory

Epstein, Seymour; Pacini, Rosemary; Denes-Raj, Veronika; Heier, Harriet

doi:10.1037/t01109-000

Cited by 9 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…The 10-item flexible thinking scale measured willingness to take into account multiple perspectives and beliefs that complex decisions cannot be reduced to “either-or” choices (Macpherson and Stanovich, 2007 ). The 10-item reflectiveness vs. intuition scale assessed beliefs that logic and careful analysis leads to better decisions than reliance on intuitions (Epstein et al, 1995 ). The 12-item need for cognition scale measured valuation of intellectual challenges, complex thinking, and logical deliberation (see Cacioppo et al, 1996 ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heuristics and biases: interactions among numeracy, ability, and reflectiveness predict normative responding

Klaczynski

2014

Front. Psychol.

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In Stanovich's (2009a, 2011) dual-process theory, analytic processing occurs in the algorithmic and reflective minds. Thinking dispositions, indexes of reflective mind functioning, are believed to regulate operations at the algorithmic level, indexed by general cognitive ability. General limitations at the algorithmic level impose constraints on, and affect the adequacy of, specific strategies and abilities (e.g., numeracy). In a study of 216 undergraduates, the hypothesis that thinking dispositions and general ability moderate the relationship between numeracy (understanding of mathematical concepts and attention to numerical information) and normative responses on probabilistic heuristics and biases (HB) problems was tested. Although all three individual difference measures predicted normative responses, the numeracy-normative response association depended on thinking dispositions and general ability. Specifically, numeracy directly affected normative responding only at relatively high levels of thinking dispositions and general ability. At low levels of thinking dispositions, neither general ability nor numeric skills related to normative responses. Discussion focuses on the consistency of these findings with the hypothesis that the implementation of specific skills is constrained by limitations at both the reflective level and the algorithmic level, methodological limitations that prohibit definitive conclusions, and alternative explanations.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heuristics and biases: interactions among numeracy, ability, and reflectiveness predict normative responding

Klaczynski

2014

Front. Psychol.

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“…Consistent with the predictions of CEST, Epstein et al found that the two scales were orthogonal ( r =−.07), thus confirming the independent nature of the rational and experiential systems, and predicted a wide variety of self‐reported personality, coping and adjustment variables, as well as participants' degree of heuristic thinking in response to a series of vignettes. Subsequently, Pacini and Epstein have reported two studies using a longer, revised (40 item) version of the REI (Epstein, Pacini, & Norris, 1998). In contrast with the original version, an explicit distinction is drawn in the revised REI between ‘engagement’ and ‘ability’ in respect of the major theoretical constructs underpinning CEST.…”

Section: Operationalizing Intuitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuition: A fundamental bridging construct in the behavioural sciences

Hodgkinson

Langan‐Fox

Sadler‐Smith

2008

British J of Psychology

263

208

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The concept of intuition has, until recently, received scant scholarly attention within and beyond the psychological sciences, despite its potential to unify a number of lines of inquiry. Presently, the literature on intuition is conceptually underdeveloped and dispersed across a range of domains of application, from education, to management, to health. In this article, we clarify and distinguish intuition from related constructs, such as insight, and review a number of theoretical models that attempt to unify cognition and affect. Intuition's place within a broader conceptual framework that distinguishes between two fundamental types of human information processing is explored. We examine recent evidence from the field of social cognitive neuroscience that identifies the potential neural correlates of these separate systems and conclude by identifying a number of theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the valid and reliable assessment of intuition as a basis for future research in this burgeoning field of inquiry.

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“…Even individuals inclined to engage higher order reflective processes and who possess both adequate algorithmic resources and relevant mindware sometimes make poor judgments, inferences, and decisions because of decoupling mistakes, post hoc rationalization, implementation errors, evaluation errors, task misrepresentations (Pennycook et al., 2015; Stanovich, 2018), and failures to inhibit interference from memories triggered by nonessential task contents (De Neys, 2012, 2015; Evans, 2008, 2011; Stanovich, 2011; see also the Reyna et al., 2003 discussion of “levels of rationality”). The second caveat suggests another reason that individual differences at the reflective and algorithmic levels are unlikely to fully account for reasoning and biases.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Thinking Dispositions, General Ability, Numeracy, and Instructional Set on Judgments and Decision-Making

Klaczynski

Felmban

2018

Psychol Rep

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To explore hypotheses based on Stanovich’s proposal that analytic processing comprises a reflective-level, an algorithmic level, and specific mindware, 342 participants completed measures of thinking dispositions, general ability (GA), numeracy, and probabilistic and nonprobabilistic reasoning. In a control condition, numeracy predicted probabilistic reasoning at high levels of both thinking dispositions and GA, and GA predicted nonprobabilistic reasoning at high levels of thinking dispositions. In a logic instruction condition, numeracy predicted probabilistic reasoning when GA was high, and GA affected nonprobabilistic reasoning directly. Thinking dispositions moderated neither relationship. Instead, instructions facilitated reasoning for low thinking disposition/high-ability participants, suggesting that logic instructions cued low thinking disposition individuals to engage in higher order reflective processing. The evidence is consistent with the proposals that reflective processes are essential to the allocation of algorithmic resources, and algorithmic resources are necessary for effective mindware implementation.

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Rational-Experiential Inventory

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Heuristics and biases: interactions among numeracy, ability, and reflectiveness predict normative responding

Heuristics and biases: interactions among numeracy, ability, and reflectiveness predict normative responding

Intuition: A fundamental bridging construct in the behavioural sciences

Effects of Thinking Dispositions, General Ability, Numeracy, and Instructional Set on Judgments and Decision-Making

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