Heuristics and biases: interactions among numeracy, ability, and reflectiveness predict normative responding

Abstract

In Stanovich's (2009a, 2011) dual-process theory, analytic processing occurs in the algorithmic and reflective minds. Thinking dispositions, indexes of reflective mind functioning, are believed to regulate operations at the algorithmic level, indexed by general cognitive ability. General limitations at the algorithmic level impose constraints on, and affect the adequacy of, specific strategies and abilities (e.g., numeracy). In a study of 216 undergraduates, the hypothesis that thinking dispositions and general ability moderate the relationship between numeracy (understanding of mathematical concepts and attention to numerical information) and normative responses on probabilistic heuristics and biases (HB) problems was tested. Although all three individual difference measures predicted normative responses, the numeracy-normative response association depended on thinking dispositions and general ability. Specifically, numeracy directly affected normative responding only at relatively high levels of thinking dispositions and general ability. At low levels of thinking dispositions, neither general ability nor numeric skills related to normative responses. Discussion focuses on the consistency of these findings with the hypothesis that the implementation of specific skills is constrained by limitations at both the reflective level and the algorithmic level, methodological limitations that prohibit definitive conclusions, and alternative explanations.

Additivity neglect in probability estimates: Effects of numeracy and response format

“…There has been much debate about the individual differences involved in predicting normative responses to heuristics and biases tasks. Investigations have included general ability or intelligence, thinking dispositions (e.g., measures such as the cognitive reflection test) and numeracy (Klaczynski, 2014;Sinayev & Peters, 2015;Stanovich & West, 2008;Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2013). Some show that normative responses are relatively unrelated to cognitive abilities (Stanovich & West, 2008), others claim that a high general ability is needed, but not sufficient without a favorable thinking disposition and high numeracy (Klaczynski, 2014).…”

“…Investigations have included general ability or intelligence, thinking dispositions (e.g., measures such as the cognitive reflection test) and numeracy (Klaczynski, 2014;Sinayev & Peters, 2015;Stanovich & West, 2008;Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2013). Some show that normative responses are relatively unrelated to cognitive abilities (Stanovich & West, 2008), others claim that a high general ability is needed, but not sufficient without a favorable thinking disposition and high numeracy (Klaczynski, 2014). Some studies claim that thinking dispositions have a high predictive validity (Frederick, 2005;Toplak et al, 2013), whereas other studies indicate that such measures explain less variance than "pure" numeric ability (Sinayev & Peters, 2015).…”

Learning about Probability from Text and Tables: Do Color Coding and Labeling through an Interactive‐user Interface Help?

“…We also assessed participants' need for cognition. As described earlier, findings from previous studies (Klaczynski, ; Kokis et al, ; Morsanyi et al, ) have shown that need for cognition is related to probabilistic reasoning skills. Therefore, we expected that need for cognition would be related to participants' ability to compute posterior probabilities after our training sessions.…”

Individual differences in epistemically suspect beliefs: The role of analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases

“…One of the aims of the present study was to examine the relative contributions of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, cognitive reflection, numeracy, and scientific reasoning to overall bias susceptibility. Previous research has already brought evidence for the roles of all of these factors in susceptibility to reasoning and decision-making biases Klaczynski, 2014;Šrol & De Neys, 2019;Toplak et al, 2011). However, none of the studies yet to my knowledge managed to include in their analyses all of these predictors at once, thus possibly precluding the information about their relative contributions to susceptibility to cognitive biases.…”

“…It should be mentioned, however, that since the roles of these factors are usually studied in isolation, their relative contributions to the adoption and maintenance of epistemically suspect beliefs are relatively unknown. In cognitive bias research, on the other hand, the roles of all of the abovementioned individual difference factors in susceptibility to various reasoning and decision-making biases is much better established (Klaczynski, 2014;Šrol & De Neys, 2019;Stanovich et al, 2016;Teovanović, Knežević, & Stankov, 2015;Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). For these reasons, the six factorsi.e.…”