Rational endorsement

Fleisher, Will

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0976-4

Cited by 42 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…The attitude of acceptance has been introduced in epistemology and philosophy of science as an attitude that we might adopt in inquiry. It is usually taken to be importantly different from belief (see Weirich () for an overview of various ways of characterizing acceptance, and also the comparison Fleisher () offers between endorsement and acceptance for further references). Acceptance is often distinguished from belief in that, unlike belief, it is voluntary, and not bound by evidential support.…”

Section: Comparison With Other Inquiry‐guiding Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Staffel

2019

Philosophical Issues

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Section: Comparison With Other Inquiry‐guiding Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fleisher () has recently argued that the attitude of endorsement plays an important role in inquiry. He argues that endorsement “is the appropriate attitude to take toward one's favored theory during the course of inquiry, within the domain of a cutting‐edge research field” (p. 4).…”

Section: Comparison With Other Inquiry‐guiding Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Staffel

2019

Philosophical Issues

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“…They are making important new arguments available, avoiding inappropriate deference, and perhaps even promoting diverse perspectives. Furthermore, I would add that they are contributing to an appropriate division of cognitive labor (Kitcher 1990; Strevens 2003), helping to avoid premature consensus (Zollman 2010), and being appropriately sensitive to considerations of collective inquiry (Fleisher 2018). For these reasons, I agree that Ben, Sanjay, and Rachel are acting epistemically and philosophically appropriately in publishing these claims.…”

Section: Publishing Without Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 1 For the reasons to worry about the appropriateness of belief, see Frances (2010, 2013), Goldberg (2013). For proposed alternative attitudes, see Barnett (2019), Carter (2018), Goldberg (2015), McKaughan (2007), Palmira (2018), and Fleisher (2018). For accounts of philosophical assertion, see Goldberg (2015) and Fleisher (2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Publishing without (some) belief

Fleisher

2020

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Philosophers have recently been interested in the appropriate attitude to have toward a controversial philosophical theory. There are a variety of reasons to doubt that belief is appropriate, as the high epistemic standards required for justified belief would seem to exclude too many philosophical theories as viable options. Relatedly, there are worries about assertions of philosophical claims, since assertion is also thought to be governed by substantive epistemic norms. In light of this, a variety of alternative attitudes have been proposed in order to characterize philosophical commitment and assertion. 1 Alexandra Plakias (2019) has helpfully expanded this discussion to the topic of philosophical publication. Plakias argues that it is permissible for philosophers to write and publish works (e.g., journal articles or books) that include claims they do not believe, a practice she calls publishing without belief (PWB). 2 Her thesis is carefully limited to philosophy, as opposed to publishing in other fields. Plakias' appeals to three helpful cases to provide a compelling argument that PWB is sometimes permissible. However, this raises further questions: just when is PWB permissible? Is it universally or even generally permissible? I argue that only claims of a certain kind are permissible to publish without belief. The picture I propose recognizes two roles for claims made in published works: what I will call the advocacy and evidential roles. Advocacy claims should often be published despite authors' lack of belief in them. Evidential role claims, however, require a higher epistemic standing, one that does include a belief requirement. On this theory, Plakias' cases are permissible examples of PWB because they involve advocacy role claims. I will offer another three cases illustrating that it is impermissible to publish evidential role claims without belief. The resulting account of the norms of publishing is applicable to research areas beyond just philosophy.

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“…See e.g McKaughan (2008). andWhitt (1990) for different overviews of the literature on scientific pursuitworthiness.3 As far as I am aware, the only notable exception is a recent article byWill Fleisher (2018) with which I will engage at various points of the present investigation.4 To forestall misunderstandings: The role of Lucy's case is not to offer a faithful reconstruction of scientific practice but rather to illustrate the possibility of three-stage inquiries by giving it some concreteness.5 I would like to thank Tim Schroeder for suggesting this nice example to me.…”

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confidence: 99%

Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes

Palmira

2018

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Rational endorsement

Cited by 42 publications

References 67 publications

Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Publishing without (some) belief

Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes

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