Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes

Palmira, Michele

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01955-3

Cited by 22 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Another recently characterized attitude that plays a role in inquiry is Palmira's () notion of hypothesis. Palmira is interested in cases of inquiry in which one tries to find the best answer to a given question, for example which theory best explains some biological phenomenon.…”

Section: Comparison With Other Inquiry‐guiding Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Staffel

2019

Philosophical Issues

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Section: Comparison With Other Inquiry‐guiding Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Palmira () briefly discusses how hypothesis is different from Fleisher's endorsement on p. 11 of his article. There is also a nice summary of the main differences between suspension, belief and hypothesis on p. 12 that interested readers might want to consult.…”

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confidence: 99%

Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Staffel

2019

Philosophical Issues

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“…For one thing, there is a large and persuasive literature in the philosophy of science detailing situations wherein inquiry may proceed well without scientists believing their claims (e.g. Kapitan, 1992;Dawes, 2013;Cabrera, 2018;Dellsén, 2018;Palmira, 2020, Fleisher, 2020. But over and above this we do not think that bad faith can be required of people.…”

Section: Norms For Public Avowalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

Dang

Bright

2021

Synthese

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We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H. Bragg’s early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward.

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“…It would be a mistake, however, to think that epistemic rationality only governs the formation or withholding of beliefs. In recent years, epistemologists and philosophers of science have come to recognize an array of non-doxastic or quasi-doxastic states and processes that are subject to epistemic norms (Fleisher, 2018;Friedman, 2013;Lacey, 2015;Palmira, 2019;Whitcomb, 2017). These include, most notably, the attitudes associated with our core epistemic practice of inquiry.…”

Section: Agents Rationality and Inquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Defeasible Calculus for Zetetic Agents

Millson

2020

LLP

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The study of defeasible reasoning unites epistemologists with those working in AI, in part, because both are interested in epistemic rationality. While it is traditionally thought to govern the formation and (with)holding of beliefs, epistemic rationality may also apply to the interrogative attitudes associated with our core epistemic practice of inquiry, such as wondering, investigating, and curiosity. Since generally intelligent systems should be capable of rational inquiry, AI researchers have a natural interest in the norms that govern interrogative attitudes. Following its recent coinage, we use the term "zetetic" to refer to the properties and norms associated with the capacity to inquire. In this paper, we argue that zetetic norms can be modeled via defeasible inferences to and from questions-a.k.a erotetic inferences-in a manner similar to the way norms of epistemic rationality are represented by defeasible inference rules. We offer a sequent calculus that accommodates the unique features of "erotetic defeat" and that exhibits the computational properties needed to inform the design of zetetic agents. The calculus presented here is an improved version of the one presented in Millson (2019), extended to cover a new class of defeasible erotetic inferences.

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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes

Cited by 22 publications

References 27 publications

Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

A Defeasible Calculus for Zetetic Agents

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