Rational Decisions

Good, I. J.

doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1952.tb00104.x

Cited by 687 publications

(456 citation statements)

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“…It was rejected by Keynes, Kyburg, Smith (1961), Good (1951Good ( , 1961 maybe, Ellsberg (1961Ellsberg ( , 2002, I.Levi, T.Seidenfeld, P.Walley among others. I replace confirmational uniqueness by the following requirement:…”

Section: Confirmational Consistency: K Is Consistent If and Only If Cmentioning

confidence: 96%

Probability logic, logical probability, and inductive support

Levi

2009

Synthese

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This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer's confirmational commitments-except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational commitments. In the case where credal judgments are numerically determinate confirmational commitments correspond to Carnap's credibility functions mathematically represented by so-called confirmation functions. Serious investigation of the conditions under which confirmational commitments should be changed ought to be a prime target for critical reflection. The necessarians were mistaken in thinking that confirmational commitments are immune to legitimate modification altogether. But their personalist or subjectivist critics went too far in suggesting that we might dispense with confirmational commitments. There is room for serious reflection on conditions under which changes in confirmational commitments may be brought under critical control. Undertaking such reflection need not become embroiled in the anti inductivism that has characterized the work of Popper, Carnap and Jeffrey and narrowed the focus of students of logical and methodological issues pertaining to inquiry.

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Section: Confirmational Consistency: K Is Consistent If and Only If Cmentioning

confidence: 96%

Probability logic, logical probability, and inductive support

Levi

2009

Synthese

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“…For the reconciliation of these additional tertiary readings will be needed, and so on: we have an infinite regress. Good (1952Good ( , 1971) has suggested that the higher one goes in this regress, the less important the values become. It remains to be shown under what psychological circumstances the process coverges so as to assure a unique ultimate reconciliation.…”

Section: Methods Of Reconciliationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This gap in the theory and practice of decision analysis and personalist inference was noted as early as the 50's (Good, 1952;Savage, 1954). Good in particular has made significant contributions to various aspects of the problem (Good, 1967(Good, , 1971(Good, , 1976.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving judgment by reconciling incoherence

Brown

Lindley

1982

Theor Decis

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This paper discusses how a subject's judgments about his actions, uncertainties and values may be improved by seeking out and reconciling inconsistences between related judgments. Decision theory tells us that there are relationships between coherent judgments, such as between a prior, likelihood and posterior, but does not tell us how a subject is to reconcile his own, possibly incoherent, views. The role of coherence in improving judgments is not clear. This paper discusses whether there is a unique, best reconciliation of incoherent judgments and how such reconciliation could improve decision-making. The basic principles of the coherent view are explained and a language developed in which the problem of reconciliation can be discussed. The practical importance of the problem is emphasized, illustrated by several examples and possible solutions are explored.Theory and Decision 14 (1982) 113-132.

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“…The logarithmic scoring rule was proposed by Good [5]; it is strictly proper and has been widely used under various names, including the predictive deviance and the ignorance score.…”

Section: Logarithmic Scorementioning

confidence: 99%

PredictiveScores

Gneiting¹

2012

Encyclopedia of Environmetrics

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Predictive scores assess the quality of forecasts, by assigning a numerical score based on the forecast and on the event or value that materializes. Probabilistic forecasts take the form of a predictive probability distribution. Their evaluation calls for the use of proper scoring rules, such as the logarithmic score or the continuous ranked probability score. Effective point forecasting requires a directive in the form of a target functional, say a quantile or the mean of the predictive distribution. It is then critical for the scoring function to be decision theoretically consistent, so that the expected score is minimized when following the directive. For example, the squared error is consistent when the point forecast is desired to be a mean, and the absolute error is consistent when we seek a median.

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Rational Decisions

Cited by 687 publications

References 0 publications

Probability logic, logical probability, and inductive support

Probability logic, logical probability, and inductive support

Improving judgment by reconciling incoherence

PredictiveScores

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