Rational Coordination with no Communication or Conventions

Goranko, Valentin; Kuusisto, Antti; Rönnholm, Raine

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_3

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…This label-independent approach leads to a combinatorial classification of games according to the symmetries found in them. A further treatment of this extension of the concept of symmetry and a discussion of how it can contribute in finding equilibria of games can be found in [ST18] or, in a quite different context [GKR17].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural relations of symmetry among players in strategic games

Tohmé

Viglizzo

2019

International Journal of General Systems

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The notions of symmetry and anonymity in strategic games have been formalized in different ways in the literature. We propose a combinatorial framework to analyze these notions, using group actions. Then, the same framework is used to define partial symmetries in payoff matrices. With this purpose, we introduce the notion of the role a player plays with respect to another one, and combinatorial relations between roles are studied. Building on them, we define relations directly between players, which provide yet another characterization of structural symmetries in the payoff matrices of strategic games.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural relations of symmetry among players in strategic games

Tohmé

Viglizzo

2019

International Journal of General Systems

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“…However, similar work exists, the most notable example being the seminal article [6] that studies a generalization of WLC-games in a framework that has some similarities with our setting. Also the papers [8], [10], [7], [9] have a similar focus, as they also concentrate on coordination games with discrete win-lose outcomes. However, the papers [8], [10], [7], [9] do not investigate optimality of protocols in repeated games, unlike the current paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also the papers [8], [10], [7], [9] have a similar focus, as they also concentrate on coordination games with discrete win-lose outcomes. However, the papers [8], [10], [7], [9] do not investigate optimality of protocols in repeated games, unlike the current paper. The seminal work [6] introduces (what is equivalent to) the two-player CM-games in their final section on general examples.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Optimal Way to Play the Most Difficult Repeated Coordination Games

Kuusisto

Rönnholm

2021

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games, covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected coordination times. We begin by analysing Choice Matching Games (CM-games) which are a simple yet fundamental type of WLC-games, where the goal of the players is to pick the same choice from a finite set of initially indistinguishable choices. We give a fully complete classification of optimal expected and guaranteed coordination times in two-player CM-games and show that the corresponding optimal protocols are unique in every case-except in the CM-game with four choices, which we analyse separately.Our results on CM-games are essential for proving a more general result on the difficulty of all WLC-games: we provide a complete analysis of least upper bounds for optimal expected coordination times in all two-player WLC-games as a function of game size. We also show that CM-games can be seen as the most difficult games among all two-player WLC-games, as they turn out to have the greatest optimal expected coordination times.

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Rational Coordination in Games with Enriched Representations

Goranko

Kuusisto

Rönnholm

2018

Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies

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We consider pure win-lose coordination games where the representation of the game structure has additional features that are commonly known to the players, such as colouring, naming, or ordering of the available choices or of the players. We study how the information provided by such enriched representations affects the solvability of these games by means of principles of rational reasoning in coordination scenarios with no prior communication or conventions.

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Rational Coordination with no Communication or Conventions

Cited by 4 publications

References 16 publications

Structural relations of symmetry among players in strategic games

Structural relations of symmetry among players in strategic games

The Optimal Way to Play the Most Difficult Repeated Coordination Games

Rational Coordination in Games with Enriched Representations

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