Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation? Filibustering Among Retiring Senators

Overby, L. Marvin; Bell, Lauren C.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00282.x

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…26 Following Overby and Bell (2004), we classify as retiring those senators who voluntarily departed (for personal reasons or to pursue other office), excluding those who were expelled or defeated in either primary or general elections.…”

Section: Characteristics Of Constituenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Guns and Votes

Bouton

Conconi

Pino

et al. 2014

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Why are U.S. congressmen reluctant to support gun control regulations, despite the fact that most Americans are in favor of them? We argue that re-election motives can lead politicians to take a pro-gun stance against the interests of an apathetic majority of the electorate, but in line with the interests of an intense minority. We develop a model of gun control choices in which incumbent politicians are both office and policy motivated, and voters differ in the direction and intensity of their preferences. We derive conditions under which politicians support gun control early in their terms, but oppose them when they approach re-election. We test the predictions of the model by analyzing votes on gun-related legislation in the U.S. Senate, in which one third of the members are up for re-election every two years. We find that senators are more likely to vote pro gun when they are close to facing re-election, a result which holds comparing both across and within legislators. Only Democratic senators "flip flop'' on gun control, and only if the group of pro-gun voters in their constituency is of intermediate size.

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Section: Characteristics Of Constituenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These data come from Overby and Bell (2004), augmented using information from the website rollcall.com.…”

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confidence: 99%

Guns and Votes

Bouton

Conconi

Pino

et al. 2014

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“…12 Following Overby and Bell (2004), we classify senators as retiring if they voluntarily departed (for personal reasons or to pursue other office), but exclude those who were expelled or defeated in primary or general elections.…”

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confidence: 99%

Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

Conconi

Facchini

Zanardi

2014

Journal of International Economics

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This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two-and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two. This result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills. The protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats.JEL classifications: D72, F10.

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“…obstrucción leGislativa: lo Que es y su relevancia práctica La obstrucción legislativa, entendida como una estrategia para retrasar la toma de decisiones en un Parlamento puede ocurrir de diversas formas. El uso ilimitado de la palabra en el Senado norteamericano, conocido como filibustering, es una de esas prácticas dilatorias que ha recibido más atención en la literatura especializada (Binder y Smith 1997;Binder, Lawrence y Smith 2002;Overby y Bell 2004). O sea, tomar la palabra sin límite de tiempo puede alargar el proceso decisorio minando las resistencias de los participantes, vencidas por el cansancio.…”

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Obstrucción y proceso decisorio en la Cámara de los Diputados: Brasil 1991-2010

Rennó

Hiroi

2015

Am. Lat. Hoy. Rev. Cienc. Soc.

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RESUMEN: En este artículo se explica cómo la gestión de la coalición de gobierno y los atributos de la dinámica del conflicto entre e intra-coaliciones, tanto del gobierno como de la oposición, afectan a la incidencia de movimientos de obstrucción en la Cámara de los Diputados brasileña entre 1991 y 2010. Los movimientos de obstrucción son operacionalizados a través del porcentaje de votaciones nominales mensuales relativas a requerimientos procedimentales que de alguna forma retrasan la decisión sobre una propuesta legislativa. Se encuentra que la proporcionalidad en la distribución de cargos en los ministerios es eficiente a la hora de reducir la obstrucción en coaliciones menores. En coaliciones mayores, este tipo de incentivo tiene poco efecto para reducir movimientos obstruccionistas. Coaliciones de gobierno menores, más unidas y mejor administradas, son más eficientes que alianzas hinchadas para aminorar los problemas de toma de decisión en la Cámara de los Diputados.

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Rational Behavior or the Norm of Cooperation? Filibustering Among Retiring Senators

Cited by 18 publications

References 15 publications

Guns and Votes

Guns and Votes

Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

Obstrucción y proceso decisorio en la Cámara de los Diputados: Brasil 1991-2010

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