Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.01.007

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 23 publications

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“…11 9 We impose this axiom, although one does not have to rule out taxing or subsidizing public project provision. See Güth et al (2012) for an experiment investigating the robustness of procedurally fair bidding to the introduction of taxes and subsidies.…”

Section: The Procedurally Fair Egalitarian Biddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality

et al. 2013

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This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.

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Section: The Procedurally Fair Egalitarian Biddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality

et al. 2013

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Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism

Güth¹

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractA group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are implemented, and the positive or negative payments due to the participating members. We justify and discuss this procedural fairness approach and compare it with that of optimal, e.g. welfaristic game theoretic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979).

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Providing revenue-generating projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis

Güth¹,

Koukoumelis²,

Levati

et al. 2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis

Cited by 5 publications

References 23 publications

Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality

Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality

Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism

Providing revenue-generating projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis

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