Random or Retributive?

Abstract

This article provides a critical examination of the current theoretical debate concerning the effects of indiscriminate violence. It argues that indiscriminate violence has been treated as an essentially random counterinsurgency tactic, but that the important distinction between itsrandomandretributivevariations has been overlooked, along with critical issues of timing and location, which has made it difficult to evaluate its efficacy in quelling rebel violence. Prior research has shown that both random and retributive violence reduced insurgent activity in the targeted locations and in the short term, but it does not necessarily follow that indiscriminate violence is effective. This article uses microlevel ethnographic evidence from Chechen villages during the period from 2001 to 2005 to show that indiscriminate violence deployed retributively against village communities generated insurgent activity in other areas because local avengers and rebels from the targeted populations sought to avoid further retributive violence against their village communities. Moreover, the insurgent activity occurred at least nine months after the initial act of retributive violence. Indiscriminate violence deployed randomly against village communities generated insurgent activity within the same targeted area, since the insurgents did not fear retributive violence in retaliation, and occurred with a delay of at least six months. As a result, the rebel reaction to indiscriminate violence is not observed immediately or, in the case of retributive violence, in the same location. This finding has crucial implications for evaluating the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency operations, and underscores the importance of understanding how the social and political context can shape the way populations react to different forms of violence.

Targeting and Public Opinion: An Experimental Analysis in Ukraine

“…Armed actors target civilians along a spectrum ranging from fully discriminate to fully indiscriminate violence, with additional variation in terms of intensity, arbitrariness, and across other factors. Indiscriminate violence can be almost completely random with any and all civilians liable to be attacked, while in other cases it can be more retributive against particular groups – though such groups may be conceived in the broadest of terms (Souleimanov and Siroky 2016). We hope future work will build on our findings by analyzing the effects of differences along such dimensions of violence.…”

“…Insights from Donbas therefore offer an opportunity both to understand broader dynamics of violence in the post-Soviet region, as well as to test theories of the relationship between violence and civilian attitudes more generally. The Donbas conflict differs in certain respects from other post-Soviet conflicts, such as in Chechnya, Georgia, and the North Caucasus, in which opposing sides belonged to different ethnic groups, and have been the subject of considerable empirical study into the consequences of violence (e.g., Lyall 2009, 2010; Souleimanov and Siroky 2016). Further below, we discuss how our results may be interpreted in light of the more modest role of ethnicity in the Donbas conflict.…”

“…In some contexts, indiscriminate violence can even drive civilians into the arms of the adversary as their best chance to survive, because siding with the perpetrator offers little relief or guarantee of being spared from attack. In Chechnya, indiscriminate attacks by Russian forces often had an opposite effect than intended, pushing villagers further into the rebels’ camp (Souleimanov and Siroky 2016).…”

“…The causes and effects of these targeting decisions have generated important findings and debates (e.g., Stanton 2016;Lyall 2009). Targeting decisions may affect many aspects of conflict, such as final outcomes (Lyall and Wilson 2009;Tellez 2019); the frequency or lethality of subsequent attacks (Condra and Shapiro 2012;Souleimanov and Siroky 2016); civilian resettlement decisions (Steele 2009); and local reporting on armed groups' activities (Schutte 2017).…”

Rebel Territorial Control and Civilian Collective Action in Civil War: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines

“…However, political allegiances are remarkably fluid even in ethno-nationalist conflicts: communities may choose to align with a state dominated by noncoethnics, especially if security under the state exceeds that expected under coethnic rebels (Kalyvas 2006(Kalyvas , 2008Staniland 2012a). For example, Souleimanov and Siroky (2016) find that, in response to civiliantargeted counterinsurgent violence in their communities, Chechen villagers often mobilized collective action to pressure coethnic Chechen insurgents to refrain from attacking Russian troops or to defect by aligning with pro-Russian Chechen militias.…”