Frankenstein in Grozny: vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule

Souleimanov, Emil; Abbasov, Namig; Siroky, David S.

doi:10.1007/s10308-018-0520-y

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…According to the existing literature, 'Traditional Islam' as a phenomenon exists in all post-Soviet Muslim states: Kazakhstan (Omelicheva 2011(Omelicheva , 2016, Kyrgyzstan (Tromble 2014), Tajikistan (Lenz-Raymann 2014), Turkmenistan (Kuru 2002) and Uzbekistan (Khalid 2003;Omelicheva 2016), as well as in Russia, which has a sizable Muslim population (Dannreuther 2010a(Dannreuther , 2010bDi Puppo 2019;Souleimanov et al 2019;Müller 2019). As such, TI has a number of common features.…”

Section: Traditional Islam From a Post-soviet Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting Nation, State and Government: ‘Traditional Islam’ in Azerbaijan

Bedford¹,

Mahmudlu²,

Abilov³

2021

Europe-Asia Studies

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The article contributes to a better understanding of 'Traditional Islam' (TI), a state-led project in Azerbaijan to establish an alternative narrative promoting a specific local understanding of Islam that builds on its non-political, non-sectarian and national features to prevent 'non-traditional' religious variants from gaining popular traction. The phenomenon has not appeared in a vacuum. First, its features and functions stem from Soviet-era anti-religious and nationalities policies. Second, many aspects of TI resemble counter-radicalisation initiatives worldwide. Finally, while introduced as a means of blocking radicalisation in order to protect Azerbaijan's national identity as a secular state, Traditional Islam in fact works to extend state control over the religious domain and thus to prevent the development of any religiously grounded dissent against the authoritarian regime.'IF MY PEOPLE MUST BE MUSLIM, LET THEM BE THIS KIND OF Muslim. If my brother wants to be Muslim, I'd want him to follow Traditional Islam.' 1 This comment was made by Gunduz Ismayilov, a representative of the Azerbaijani State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (Dini Qurumlarla İş Üzrə Dövlət Komitəsi-SCWRA), the lead institution behind an ambitious state project to counteract the spread of 'foreign' Islam among the citizens of Azerbaijan through the development and promotion of a national religious creed and practice-Traditional Islam (Ənənəvi İslam-TI). Most citizens of post-Soviet Azerbaijan identify as Muslim. What this quote underscores it that, for religious and secular elites, Islam is perceived as a key part of the national ideology and is seen as integral to the new Azerbaijani identity (Mahmudlu 2017). The state is strictly secular; the fear of radicalisation as a result of foreign religious influences promoting a worldview where Islam plays a more prominent, and ultimately political, role has been an important factor in domestic policy since the beginning of the 2000s. How this threat has been used by the ruling elite to legitimise strengthened control over religious

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Section: Traditional Islam From a Post-soviet Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting Nation, State and Government: ‘Traditional Islam’ in Azerbaijan

Bedford¹,

Mahmudlu²,

Abilov³

2021

Europe-Asia Studies

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“…His rise and success were made possible by the special relationship that prevailed between him and Putin. In exchange for the personal support of the Russian president and authority to govern with absolute power in the republic, Kadyrov ensures Chechnya's compliance with the Russian Federation (Russell, 2009;Souleimanov, Abbasov, and Siroky, 2019;Wilhelmsen, 2018). Backed and supported by Putin, Kadyrov continues brutally and unlawfully to suppress any armed and political opposition (Ware, 2009) and to eliminate potential competitors.…”

Section: Chechnya: the Need For Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite this, however, Kadyrov's impunity coupled with outrageous violations of the law, his servile loyalty to Putin, his suppression of the Chechen population, and the way he flaunts his wealth -which contrasts with the impoverished majority of the population -undermines Kadyrov's efforts at self-legitimation (Russell, 2009;Souleimanov, Abbasov, and Siroky, 2019). Kadyrov understands that the orchestrated rallies of loyalty and support for the current regime do not represent the genuine feelings of the population.…”

Section: Chechnya: the Need For Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security and Religion: The Discursive Self-legitimation of the Chechen Authorities

Iliyasov

2021

J. Muslims Eur.

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This article analyses the official discourse of the Chechen authorities and posits that it reflects the government’s efforts as self-legitimation. This investigation seeks to identify the mechanisms exploited by the Chechen regime to boost self-legitimacy by examining the ‘News’ programme on the Chechen state television channel ‘Grozny’, which, in the authoritarian setting of Chechnya, became the government’s mouthpiece and a propagator of official discourse. To provide for the context and to boost findings, the study is complemented by a discursive analysis of one more historical-political television programme and a political advertisement that was broadcast by the same channel during the period in which the fieldwork took place. The collected data is processed using Critical Discourse Analysis.

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“…Indirect rule consists in a central (or an external) power’s “cooptation of [local] notables sitting atop relatively rigid hierarchical social systems” (Boone, 2003; Darbon, 1988, p. 124; cf. Doyle, 1986; Gerring et al, 2011; Hechter, 2000; Iyer, 2010; Kocher & Monteiro, 2016; Lawrence, 2013; Souleimanov et al, 2018). 9 This definition highlights the distinctive cultural identity of authorities in a given sub-unit of a state or colony.…”

Section: Why (No) Peripheral Nationalism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Containing Nationalism: Culture, Economics and Indirect Rule in Corsica

Siroky

Mueller

Fazi

et al. 2020

Comparative Political Studies

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Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to contain peripheral nationalism. Through the exchange of economic resources for political control, local notables are co-opted into cementing loyalty to the central state. Although nationalism often has cultural roots, these can fail to bear fruit because indirect rulers prevent them from developing. When the incentives sustaining support for indirect rulers change, this can open a window of opportunity for nationalism. This article examines how culture, institutions and economics influence center-periphery relations, specifically the demand for autonomy and nationalist parties. Utilizing new, disaggregated data and an original survey from the French island of Corsica, we show that indirect rulers have managed to contain nationalist parties in culturally distinct communes, specifically those that are more dependent on public funds. Only where a thriving private sector offers alternatives to state dependence, lessening the force of indirect rule, is cultural distinctiveness associated with nationalist voting.

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Frankenstein in Grozny: vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule

Cited by 10 publications

References 25 publications

Protecting Nation, State and Government: ‘Traditional Islam’ in Azerbaijan

Protecting Nation, State and Government: ‘Traditional Islam’ in Azerbaijan

Security and Religion: The Discursive Self-legitimation of the Chechen Authorities

Containing Nationalism: Culture, Economics and Indirect Rule in Corsica

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