Rallying intolerance in the valleys: Explaining support for the extreme right in Wales

Abstract

Until its decline at the 2012 elections, the British National Party (BNP) was the most electorally successful extreme right party in the United Kingdom. Yet, although the party's electoral growth in England has attracted attention, individual and contextual drivers of BNP support in other areas -namely, Wales -have been ignored. The lack of research is puzzling, given that the party has actively campaigned beyond England and attracted some support for its ethnic nationalism amidst a resurgence of support for Welsh nationalism. Drawing on a range of data, we examine the socio-economic, political and demographic drivers of BNP support in Wales. At the aggregate level, we find the party performs strongest in economically insecure and urban areas that have large social housing sectors, high deprivation rates, low education levels, large numbers of residents in precarious occupations, and which have experienced the largest increases in unemployment rates since the onset of the financial crisis. Politically, our findings suggest that the BNP has also rallied votes in areas where turnout is low, and where support for Labour has traditionally been strong. Individual-level analysis of 'core' and 'soft' supporters reveals that although they share a similar profile -less-well educated and middle-aged men who tend to be skilled workers -soft sympathy appears more widespread among women and younger citizens. Foremost, and despite a broader context of comparatively low migration and ethnic diversity rates in Wales, both groups of supporters are driven to the extreme right by concerns over immigration, which appear to be tied strongly to broader feelings of political abandonment. In contrast to results in England, our findings suggest that immigration-related concerns do not stem from the actual presence or proximity of immigrant and/or minority groups. Rather, it appears that structural economic disadvantage, political disenchantment and the perceived negative impact of immigration provide a more convincing explanation for the limited electoral appeal of the extreme right in Wales.

The United Kingdom: Hybrid Populisms, Mixed Fortunes, and Unstable Support

“…Ford et al, (2012) note, for example, that UKIP core supporters are likely to be more working class, more likely to live in the south, and more xenophobic and racist than strategic supporters. Support for UKIP is mainly focused in the South and the Midlands (Ford et al, 2012), whereas support for the BNP has been mainly in the declining industrial towns of the North (Ford, 2010; and in economically deprived urban areas of Wales (Goodwin & Harris, 2013). EDL supporters live in or near the large conurbations in the United Kingdom (Bartlett & Littler, 2011).…”

Räumliche Aspekte rechter Orientierungen Auf dem Weg zu einem konzeptionellen Rahmen

“…Am Beispiel niederländischer Nachbarschaften kann gar ein Schwelleneffekt nachgewiesen werden, wonach die Zustimmung zur PVV in Nachbarschaften mit einem Migrationsanteil von mehr als 15 % besonders stark steigt (Savelkoul, Laméris & Tolsma, 2017). Insbesondere nicht-westliche Migrant_innen mit muslimischer Religionszughörigkeit lösen bei den Befragten Bedrohungsgefühle und Ängste vor Überfremdung aus, die die Wahl von rechten Parteien begünstigen (Ford & Goodwin, 2010;Goodwin & Harris, 2013;Savelkoul, Laméris & Tolsma 2017;Abbondanza & Bailo, 2018). Dabei ist der tatsächliche Anteil dieser Bevölkerungsgruppe in der jeweils untersuchten Kontexteinheit (z.B.…”

“…der Nachbarschaft oder des Wahlkreises) nur bedingt entscheidend, wie Fallstudien in Gebieten mit geringer Zuwanderung zeigen. Hier resultiert die Zustimmung zu rechten Parteien überwiegend aus individuellen oder kollektiven Bedrohungswahrnehmungen (Goodwin & Harris, 2013;Berning, 2016), die z.B. durch Migrationsthematiken in der Medienberichterstattung beeinf lusst werden (Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw, 2011).…”

“…Dies erklärt der Autor mit der Angst vor zukünftigen Wohlstandsverlusten (Stockemer, 2017). In britischen und österreichischen altindustriellen Regionen, die den Strukturwandel langsamer vollziehen und hohe Arbeitslosenquoten aufweisen, sind auch die Zustimmungswerte für rechte Parteien höher, was für die oben formulierten Thesen spricht (Ford & Goodwin, 2010;Goodwin & Harris, 2013;Essletzbichler, Disslbacher & Moser, 2018). In den Studien zu England und Wales wird deutlich, dass es sich bei den Wähler_innen überwiegend um Angehörige der Arbeiterklasse mit geringer Bildung, prekär Beschäftigte und ärmer Bevölkerungsteile handelt.…”

We Never Change, Do We? Economic Anxiety and Far‐Right Identification in a Postcrisis Europe*

“…Interestingly, when scholars have conducted micro‐level studies to get at those foundations, a very different story regarding the connection between the economy and an individual's vote choice has emerged. Almost uniformly, scholars conducting analyses on how an individual's economic situation affects his or her likelihood to support far‐right parties have found little to no connection between poor economic conditions and increased affinity for ERPs (see, e.g., Knigge, ; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, ; Ford and Goodwin, ; Goodwin and Harris, ). These findings hold across and within countries, as well as during different time periods.…”