Radiological protection regulation during spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in the Western Branch of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise ‘SevRAO’

Self Cite

In the 1960s two technical bases for the Northern Fleet were created in the Russian northwest at Andreeva Bay in the Kola Peninsula and Gremikha village on the coast of the Barents Sea. They maintained nuclear submarines, receiving and storing radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. No further waste was received after 1985, and the technical bases have since been re-categorised as temporary storage sites. The handling of these materials to put them into a safe condition is especially hazardous because of their degraded state. This paper describes regulatory activities which have been carried out to support the supervision of radiological protection during recovery of waste and spent fuel, and to support regulatory decisions on overall site remediation. The work described includes: an assessment of the radiation situation on-site; the development of necessary additional regulatory rules and standards for radiation protection assurance for workers and the public during remediation; and the completion of an initial threat assessment to identify regulatory priorities. Detailed consideration of measures for the control of radiation exposure of workers and radiation exposure of the public during and after operations and emergency preparedness and response are complete and provided in sister papers. The continuing requirements for regulatory activities relevant to the development and implementation of on-going and future remediation activities are also outlined. The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority supports the work, as part of the Norwegian Government's plan of action to promote improvements in radiation protection and nuclear safety in northwest Russia.

“…Three further papers support this paper, devoted to (i) radiological protection of SevRAO's workers [4], (ii) development of the remediation criteria [5] and (iii) emergency response [6].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 55%

Section: Independent Evaluation Of the Environmental Radioactivitymentioning

confidence: 93%

Regulatory supervision of sites for spent fuel and radioactive waste storage in the Russian Northwest

Shandala¹,

Sneve²,

Smith³

et al. 2008

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“…To assess the current radiation situation and develop measures for radiation safety of workers and the public, the following activities have been performed by the specialists of the Institute of Biophysics (now incorporated within the Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Center (SRC-FMBC)) since 2005. The SRC-FMBC work has been supported by projects within the regulatory cooperation program between the Federal Medical Biological Agency (FMBA of Russia) and the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA) [2][3][4][5] up to the end of 2021. This work includes:…”

Section: Background and Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Progress with the regulation of radiation safety during recovery and removal of spent nuclear fuel from the site for temporary storage at Andreeva Bay on the Kola Peninsula

Simakov,

Sneve,

Abramov

et al. 2023

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In the 1960s, a shore technical base (STB) was established at Andreeva Bay on the Kola Peninsula, in northwest Russia. The STB maintained nuclear submarines and the nuclear icebreaker fleet, receiving and storing fresh and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) as well as solid and liquid radioactive waste (RW). It was subsequently re-designated as a site for temporary storage (STS) for SNF and RW. Over time, the SNF storage facilities partly lost their containment functions, leading to radioactive contamination of workshops and the site above permitted values. The technological and engineering infrastructure at the site was also significantly degraded as well as the condition of the stored SNF. At present, the STS Andreeva Bay facility is under decommissioning. This paper describes progress with the creation of safe working measures for workers involved in site remediation and SNF recovery operations, including the determination of safe shift times in high radiation areas, as part of overall optimization of safety. Results are presented for the successful application of these measures in the period 2019 – 2021, during which time significant SNF recovery and removal operations were completed without incident. Significant important experience has been gained to support safe removal of remaining SNF, including the most hazardous degraded fuel, as well as recovery of other higher level RW and decommissioning of the old storage buildings and structures.

“…This article includes a review and detailed retrospective data analysis of the evolution of the radiation situation in the Andreeva Bay facility under the Northwest Center for Radioactive Waste Management SevRAO-a branch of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise 'The Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management RosRAO' (hereinafter referred to as Andreeva Bay NWC SevRAO). CTB №569 of the Northern Fleet with a staff of 270 military personnel [1] was established in the early 1960s and intended for refueling of reactors from nuclear submarines and ships of the icebreaking fleet, temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), solid and liquid radioactive waste (SRW and LRW, respectively), resulting from the operation and repair.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radiation situation dynamics at the Andreeva Bay site for temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste over the period 2002–2016

Chizhov

Sneve²,

Shandala³

et al. 2018

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The Coastal Technical Base (CTB) №569 at Andreeva Bay was established in the early 1960s and intended for the refueling of nuclear submarine reactors and temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (RW). In 2001, the base was transferred to the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy and the site remediation began. The paper describes in detail the radiation situation change at the technical site in Andreeva Bay from 2002–2016, the period of preparation for the most critical phase of remedial work: removal of spent fuel assemblies. The analysis of aggregated indicators and data mining were used. The article suggests the best number and location of checkpoints needed to ensure sufficient accuracy of the radiation situation description. The fractal properties of the radiation field are studied using the Hurst index. The relationship between checkpoints was assessed using the method of searching for checkpoint communities. The decrease in the integral of the ambient dose equivalent rate (ADER) at the technical site was evaluated by the method of time series decomposition. Three components of time series were identified: trend, seasonal and residual. The trend of the ADER integral over the technical site is a monotonic decreasing function, where the initial and final values differ tenfold. Taking into account that 137Cs dominates the radiation situation on-site, it is clear that the ADER due to the radionuclide decay will have decreased by 1.4 times. It is estimated that only a small proportion of 137Cs has migrated off-site. Therefore, approximately a sevenfold decrease in dose rate is mainly due to remediation activities of personnel. During the year, the seasonal component varies the ADER integral by a factor of two, due to snowfall. The residual component reflects the uncertainty of the ADER integral calculation and phases of active SNF and RW management. The methods developed are used to support the optimization of remediation work as well as regulatory supervision of occupational radiation protection.