Radford Revisited

Dartnall, Terry

doi:10.2307/2220194

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…They might present a general argument that shows that knowledge entails belief, or they might challenge those who would deny that knowledge entails belief to present a counterexample to the thesis—that is, a case of knowledge without belief—and then conclude the truth of condition (ii) from the failure of any opponents of that condition to present convincing counterexamples. The primary strategy in the literature has been the latter, which we will call the wait‐for‐counterexamples strategy (Cohen ; Armstrong , ; Sorenson ; Dartnall ; Steup ) . This strategy depends on the correct classification of hypothetical scenarios as cases of knowledge or belief: There must be no case that is intuitively, or properly, or in the judgment of a well‐informed philosopher (here, it seems to us, the methodological assumptions and standards of success become a bit hazy), both a case of knowledge and not a case of belief.…”

Section: The State Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Myers-Schulz

Schwitzgebel

2013

Nous

110

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Abstract:Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without -or at least without determinately -believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical.

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Section: The State Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Myers-Schulz

Schwitzgebel

2013

Nous

110

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“…11 Defenders of the entailment thesis to date have generally taken the position-opposite to ours-that since Kate does not ''believe'' she thereby cannot really know (Jones 1971;Lehrer 1968;Sorensen 1982;Stout 2006). Or they have taken the (compatible) position that the case is too unclear to topple an independently plausible plank of orthodoxy (Armstrong 1969;Lehrer 1974;Dartnall 1986;Williamson 2000). Indeed to our knowledge only Cohen (1966, p. 11) and Armstrong (1969, p. 35) …”

Section: Why the Unconfident Examinee Has Dispositional Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge entails dispositional belief

Rosé

Schaffer

2012

Philos Stud

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Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people's intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) belief.

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“…3 Radford (1966), Annis (1969), and Mannison (1976). 4 For defenses of the belief requirement on knowledge against these early challenges, see Lehrer (1968), Armstrong (1969), Sorensen (1982), Dartnall (1986), and Steup (2001). 5 Very recently, Katalin Farkas (2015, Erkenntnis) has argued for the conditional claim that if the extended mind hypothesis is right, then belief may not be necessary for knowing.…”

Section: Appendix B: Self-reference and (Kr)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For defenses of the belief requirement on knowledge against these early challenges, see Lehrer (), Armstrong (), Sorensen (), Dartnall (), and Steup ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Beliefless Knowing

Silva

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows, I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next, I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge in a certain range of cases and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state.

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Radford Revisited

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Knowledge entails dispositional belief

Beliefless Knowing

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