Knowledge entails dispositional belief

Rosé, David; Schaffer, Jonathan

doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0052-z

Cited by 59 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Indeed, asRose and Schaffer (2013), andBuckwalter et al (2013) argue, they are capable of constituting knowledge.18 Additionally, there will still be a proliferation of very similar coarse grained epistemic candidates. Coarse grained propositions can differ in fine grained ways.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Peet

2015

Philos Stud

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In the epistemology of testimony it is often assumed that audiences are able to reliably recover asserted contents. In the philosophy of language this claim is contentious. This paper outlines one problem concerning the recovery of asserted contents (the 'recovery problem'), and argues that it prevents audiences from gaining testimonial knowledge in a range of cases (even when the speaker is both sincere and a reliable belief former). The recovery problem, in essence, is simply that due to the collective epistemic limitations of the speaker and audience speakers will, in certain cases, be insensitive to the ways in which they may be misinterpreted. As a result audiences' beliefs will often fail the safety and sensitivity conditions on knowledge. Once the problem has been outlined and distinguished from several related problems in the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony, a series of responses are considered. The first response holds that audiences possess defeaters in recovery problem cases, and thus wouldn't form beliefs. The second response holds that the beliefs audiences form are very coarse grained, meaning they are not very vulnerable to failures of safety and sensitivity. The final response holds that the objects of speaker meaning are not propositional. All three responses are found to be unsatisfactory.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Peet

2015

Philos Stud

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“…One of the findings of this study was the confirmation of consistency between teachers' beliefs and their classroom practices as a key factor in the promotion of quality relationships with children. Whilst dispositional beliefs (Rose and Schaffer 2013) refer to a belief that is not currently being considered but located deep within a person's memory, whilst occurrent beliefs refer to beliefs that are currently being considered. The participating Soka educators demonstrated that their dispositional and occurrent beliefs (Rose and Schaffer 2013) were consistently in line.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whilst dispositional beliefs (Rose and Schaffer 2013) refer to a belief that is not currently being considered but located deep within a person's memory, whilst occurrent beliefs refer to beliefs that are currently being considered. The participating Soka educators demonstrated that their dispositional and occurrent beliefs (Rose and Schaffer 2013) were consistently in line. These ingrained beliefs are due to their underlying Buddhist philosophy, which leads them to use these concepts in their daily practice and everyday lives, and is reflected in their routine classroom activities.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the quality of teacher–child interactions: the Soka discourse in practice

Ikegami

Rivalland

2016

European Early Childhood Education Research Journal

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Numerous research has shown that quality of interactions between early childhood teachers and children contribute significantly to children's holistic development. Most literature on this topic comes from developed/Western countries and little is known about the kind of interactions occurring within the Soka kindergarten model. This article, based on a qualitative multi-site case study, explores the insider perspectives of 12 Soka early childhood educators based in Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Of interest was how Soka values and beliefs influence educators' relationships and interactions with young children. Postmodern ideas of discourse, power and knowledge framed the analysis. Findings indicate four components: humanism, respect, compassion and unlimited potential are major philosophical factors influencing positive relationships between teachers and children. The results suggest greater research into humanist perspectives, and how this can be utilised to benefit teachers and children, may be warranted.

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“…9 For Anti-Intellectualist explanations of this latter sort of case, see Noë (2005), Setiya (2012), and Michaelson,ms. 10 The thesis that knowledge entails belief has been endorsed in Cohen (1966), Armstrong (1969Armstrong ( , 1973, Sorensen (1982), Dartnall (1986), Rose and Schaffer (2012) and Ichikawa and Steup (2014); among others. 11 Wallis' cases are themselves drawn from Luce and Segal (1966) and Schacter (1989), respectively.…”

Section: Extant No-belief Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For counter-arguments to the luminosity of belief thesis, seeRose and Schaffer (2012) andBuckwalter et al (2013).33 See, for instance,Nagel (2013).34 To be clear, these implicit beliefs in which we are interested are standing beliefs. That is, they are long-term, stable states of the agent rather than just fleeting implicit or unconscious states-though the existence of the latter sort of state is certainly a distinct possibility.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

Brownstein

Michaelson

2015

Synthese

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We consider a range of cases-both hypothetical and actual-in which agents apparently know how to ϕ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact ϕ is a way for them to ϕ . These "no-belief" cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to ϕ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to ϕ , then an agent cannot both know how to ϕ and fail to believe that w, the way that she ϕ s, is a way for her to ϕ . We discuss a variety of ways in which Intellectualists might respond to this challenge and argue that, ultimately, this debate converges with another, seemingly distinct debate in contemporary epistemology: how to attribute belief in cases of conflict between an agent's avowals and her behavior. No-belief cases, we argue, reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility of positing something like "implicit beliefs"-which conflict with an agent's avowed beliefs-in many cases of apparent knowledge-how. While there may be good reason to posit implicit beliefs elsewhere, we suggest that there are at least some grounds for thinking that these reasons fail to carry over to no-belief cases, thus applying new pressure to Intellectualism.

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Knowledge entails dispositional belief

Cited by 59 publications

References 39 publications

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Exploring the quality of teacher–child interactions: the Soka discourse in practice

Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

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