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Comella, Brandon; Scanlon, M. R.

doi:10.1023/a:1004712007729

Cited by 24 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…128 As Víctor Ferreres Comella wrote, in Spain, the idea of constitutional amendment is somehow a "tabu", since constitution-making was the aftermath of the civil war and of the disenchantment in the normative force of the constitution. 129 Collective memory and fear of revisiting an anti-democratic past played a huge role in keeping the constitution protected from change. As a result, the mummification of the constitution has become a sort of 'Nash equilibrium' that lacks incentive for change.…”

Section: Spain 1 a Complex And Rigid Constitutional Amendment Procementioning

confidence: 99%

“…138 Therefore, there was a "strategic interest" in altering it as less as possible. 139 This is certainly a kind of functional constitutional approach, as the overall result was an effort to keep the constitutional moment frozen -entrenchment of current status quo, because if the question was reopened, the constitution would have collapsed. As the lessons from the 1931 Constitution and the Civil War taught, one of the most delicate issues is the regional structure of Spain.…”

Section: Spain 1 a Complex And Rigid Constitutional Amendment Procementioning

confidence: 99%

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Constitutional Narcissism on the Couch of Psychoanalysis

Botelho¹

2019

European Journal of Law Reform

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Comparing the Portuguese Constitution, which has the longest unamendable clause in the world, with the silence of the Spanish Constitution regarding the language of eternity is indeed a fascinating exercise. Each state's quantum of constitutional change seems to be quite different. One can wonder how two neighbouring states that share a heavy history of right-wing dictatorships and transitioned to democracy forty years ago opted for such dissimilar constitutional designs. However, appearances are often misleading, and an effort should be done to unveil this curious mismatch. Both legal orders suffer from what I call constitutional narcissism, which manifests itself through the urge to perpetuate the foundational constitutional moment. Unamendable clauses (Portugal) and quasi-unamendable clauses (Spain) recast one of constitutional theory's inner paradoxes: Can the constituent power of the people be petrified in one historical constituent decision and constrain future democratic transitions? And what if a volatile contemporary majority seeks to undermine the democratic process and run against the constitutional DNA achievements of the last centuries? Even if the original version of the Portuguese Constitution prohibited several provisions from ever being amended, some of these provisions were indeed modified or removed in the 1989 constitutional amendment process. This occurred without major disagreement from the political organs, scholars, or the judiciary. Therefore, the vexata quaestio remains unanswered: Given their obsolescence or hindrance towards good governance, should entrenchment clauses be eliminated de jure (through a channelled constitutional amendment process, such as the double amendment procedure) or de facto (through a revolutionary process materialized outside of the constitutional framework)?

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Section: Spain 1 a Complex And Rigid Constitutional Amendment Procementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Spain 1 a Complex And Rigid Constitutional Amendment Procementioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Narcissism on the Couch of Psychoanalysis

Botelho¹

2019

European Journal of Law Reform

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“…Portugal is one exception in that in addition to establishing constitutional court, it also empowers ordinary courts to set aside legislation they deem unconstitutional, but reserving the power to nullify such legislation only to the constitutional court. 45 In addition, ordinary courts in some countries are empowered to set aside legislation that was enacted before the constitution came into force. 46 With respect to tasks allocated to constitutional courts other than reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, some courts have jurisdiction to supervise the regularity of election and referenda, to verify the legality of political parties or to enforce the criminal law against higher government officials.…”

Section: Centralized Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Adjudication by Parliaments: Lessons from Comparative Experience

Tesemma¹

2018

Miz Law Rev

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This article explores historical experiences in France and Brazil and the contemporary constitutional setup in China where parliaments are empowered to adjudicate constitutional issues. It also identifies the lessons thereof for the constitutional design in Ethiopia. Comparison among three legal regimes has been made with regard to the rationales and contexts under which legislative or nonlegislative parliaments were entrusted with the power of interpreting constitutions. The experience in France (1799 to 1946), Brazil (1824-1891) and China"s current practice in constitutional interpretation are examined. The experiences across time in different jurisdictions are used to analyze the extent to which (non-)legislative assemblies are appropriate organs to adjudicate constitutional issues. The Constitution of Ethiopia is expected to take lessons from the difficulties encountered from the experiences of France, Brazil and China and resort to other institutional choices for constitutional adjudication.

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“…Unfortunately, thin film properties are different than those of bulk materials and depend on the deposition process and deposition parameters, requiring frequently the determination of these properties. Therefore, many methods have been developed, like nanoindentation (1), uniaxial tensile test (2), bulge test (3), resonant method (4,5) and others (6,7) that are used to measure Young's modulus (modulus of elasticity) of thin films.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%