Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti‐Realism?

Abstract

W. V. Quine describes himself as a "robust realist" about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological conception of objects, and how Quine's conception of objects should be understood if he is also to be regarded as a realist. I also address the question whether Quine should be placed on the realist or the anti-realist side of the current realism debate. I argue that Quine's conception of objects as posits is a general account of the nature of objects, and that this account does not conflict with Quine's realism as long as this realism is properly understood. I also argue that Quine cannot be placed on either side of the contemporary realism debate, since his realism is not metaphysical realism and his conception of objects is not an anti-realist doctrine according to which objects would be less than real.

Quine's Scientific Realism Revisited

“…Quine, 1995a, p. 15) and it might make him look like a metaphysical anti‐realist. For instance, both Fogelin (2004) and Keskinen (2012) argue in different ways on that basis for Quine being a metaphysical anti‐realist. I will argue that even the less radical metaphysical anti‐realist interpretation by Keskinen is not warranted.…”

“…Keskinen (2014, p. 141), however, argues that we should take Quine's talk of objects as posits of our theories “seriously as an account of the nature of objects”, claiming that Quine is “not a metaphysical realist” (Keskinen, 2014, p. 142). This is of course in tension with many of Quine's statements that posited objects are real and that various objects really exist.…”

“…Keskinen is fully aware of this tension which he tries to resolve by arguing that “real” has to be interpreted in Quine's philosophy also from the standpoint of some theory. He points out: “[T]he notion of reality is itself always part of a theory” (Keskinen, 2014, p. 143). Keskinen bases this on statements by Quine like the following:

[W]e are now seeing ontology as more utterly a human option than we used to … Must we then conclude that true reality is beyond our ken?

…”

Global expressivism and the flight from metaphysics

“…Quine's realism has perplexed a number of commentators insofar as he also thinks we have no conception of how things are except through our particular, pragmatically derived theoretical schemes (see e.g. Keskinen 2014). However there is really no puzzle here once one bears in mind that there is no perspective external to such schemes from which one can measure their correspondence of lack thereof.…”

Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars

“…Quine ( [1976), 40-3, (1993 [2008]), 419. 36 For detailed critique of Quine's attempt to dispense with intensional idioms and phenomena, see Parrini (1976), 19-116, Murphey (2012and Keskinen (2014).…”