Question-Embedding and Factivity

Abstract

Attitude verbs fall in different categories depending on the kind of complements which they can embed. In English, a verb like know takes both declarative and interrogative complements. By contrast, believe takes only declarative complements and wonder takes only interrogative complements. The present paper examines the hypothesis, originally put forward by Hintikka 1975, that the only verbs that can take both that-complements and whether-complements are the factive verbs. I argue that at least one half of the hypothesis is empirically correct, namely that all veridical attitude verbs taking that-complements take whether-complements. I distinguish veridical verbs from factive verbs, and present one way of deriving the generalization. Counterexamples to both directions of the factivity hypothesis are discussed, in particular the case of emotive factive verbs like regret, and the case of nonveridical verbs that licence whether-complements, in particular tell, guess, decide and agree. Alternative accounts are discussed along the way, in particular Zuber (1982), Ginzburg (1995) and Saebo (2006).

Wh-questions: Moving beyond the first phase

“…Instead, the clause has been completed, or closed off in interpretation. There is a significant literature on this semantic point (for review see Hagstrom, 2003; also Égré, 2005; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1982; Karttunen, 1977; Lahiri, 2002b). We capture the basic fact with a feature [+presupposed] projected from know 1:…”

“…In sum, we have a series of verbs: know , wonder , think, that take different kinds of complements (Égré, 2005; Lahiri, 2002b). Only some (like wonder , ask ) take an indirect question.…”

Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution

“…Linguists agree that know is factive but use the term “factive” more restrictively than philosophers; this article will follow the linguists in their more stringent usage . Linguists reserve “factive” for predicates that not only entail but also presuppose the truth of their complements (Egre, ; Kiparsky & Kiparsky, ). What is presupposed is taken for granted by the sincere speaker as a background truth, in a way that does not shift even as the factive expression is embedded under a variety of logical and modal operators.…”

“…It is a cross‐linguistically robust fact that cognitive factives like know embed questions and cognitive nonfactives like think do not, but it would be an oversimplification to conclude that all and only factives embed questions. For a detailed discussion of the exceptions, including emotive factives such as regret and interrogatives such as wonder, see Egre ().…”

Experimental Perspectives on Presuppositions

“…As for think vs. know in particular, some authors have shown that there is a correlation between a predicate's factivity and its ability to take both declarative and interrogative complements (cf. Karttunen 1977;Hintikka 1975;Ginzburg 1995;Egré 2008;a.o.). Assuming that the link is principled, and that question-embedding is a reliable cue to factivity, it could be that hearing know sentences with interrogative complements provides evidence that it is factive.…”