Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution

Nagel, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/mila.12157

Cited by 36 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…But read 'is aware of the fact that makes P true' generates complications for his claim that we need not wade into here. 7 Littlejohn (2015), Nagel (2017), and Williamson (2000:59-60). Cf.…”

Section: Appendix B: Self-reference and (Kr)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Beliefless Knowing

Silva

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows, I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next, I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge in a certain range of cases and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state.

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Section: Appendix B: Self-reference and (Kr)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Beliefless Knowing

Silva

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…In the context of the debate about knowledge‐first epistemology, some epistemologists have laid the groundwork for expanding the conception of mindreading to include attributions of knowledge. Jennifer Nagel () introduces useful terminology that we can rely on here. Traditionally the mindreading literature has been concerned about when children develop the capacity to attribute true beliefs and false beliefs.…”

Section: Mindreading Broadly Construedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This does not settle the debate about knowledge‐first epistemology, of course. There are more sophisticated analyses of developmental data (in addition to linguistic analyses and data on non‐human primates) that purport to be empirical evidence for knowledge‐first accounts (Nagel, ).…”

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confidence: 99%

What is mindreading?

Spaulding

2019

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Theory of mind, also known as mindreading, refers to our ability to attribute mental states to agents in order to make sense of and interact with other agents. Recently, theorists in this literature have advanced a broad conception of mindreading. In particular, psychologists and philosophers have examined how we attribute knowledge, intention, mentalistically loaded stereotypes, and personality traits to others. Moreover, the diversity of our goals in a social interaction—precision, efficiency, self/in‐group protection—generates diversity in the mindreading processes we employ. Finally, the products of mindreading are varied, as well. We produce different sorts of mindreading explanations depending on our epistemic goals and the situational context. In this article, I piece together these different strands of research to present a broad conception of mindreading that is complex, messy, and interesting. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief Philosophy > Psychological Capacities

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“…For instance, Williamson (2000) says that "believing p is, roughly, treating p as if one knew p" (p. 47). 6 Similarly, Jennifer Nagel (2017) writes that "Believing is [...] a shadow or after-effect of knowing: the deceived agent who reaches for the basket behaves as if she knew that the ball is in the basket" (p. 537). 7 Finally, John Hyman (2017) proposes that " [...] we can define the belief that p [...] as the disposition to act (think, feel) as one would if one knew that p." (p. 284) 8,9 I take on two tasks here.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge-first believing the unknowable

Wimmer

2019

Synthese

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I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it. Keywords Knowledge-first • Belief • Philosophy of mind • Epistemology 1 Williamson (2000) makes much of this difficulty. Several chapters in Greenough and Pritchard (2009) discuss Williamson's argumentative strategy. For further considerations against belief-first views see, e.g.,

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Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution

Cited by 36 publications

References 64 publications

Beliefless Knowing

Beliefless Knowing

What is mindreading?

Knowledge-first believing the unknowable

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