Knowledge-first believing the unknowable

Abstract

I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it. Keywords Knowledge-first • Belief • Philosophy of mind • Epistemology 1 Williamson (2000) makes much of this difficulty. Several chapters in Greenough and Pritchard (2009) discuss Williamson's argumentative strategy. For further considerations against belief-first views see, e.g.,

From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation

“…Williamson, for instance, suggests that believing that p is 'roughly, treating p as if one knew p' (Williamson 2000, 47). Somewhat similar accounts are suggested by Nagel (2017) and Hyman (2017), and a somewhat more sophisticated version of the idea is developed by Wimmer (2019). The challenge for the disjunctivist wishing to pursue this line will be, simply, to show that something like this is correct, which is no mean feat.…”

Ways to Knowledge-First Believe

“…323-4) argues, Williamson (2000) may similarly not intend to provide noncircular, necessary and sufficient conditions for belief, regarding neither knowledge nor belief as first. However, Williamson (2020) has since explicitly formulated his view as knowledge-first. So, if circularity prevents a definition from assigning priority to belief, then Williamson now seems committed to providing a non-circular, necessary and sufficient condition for belief.…”