Quantum Field Theory: Underdetermination, Inconsistency, and Idealization

Fraser, Doreen

doi:10.1086/649999

Cited by 52 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…ist attitude." A similar attitude is espoused in [Halvorson & Müger, 2006], [MacKinnon, 2008], [Fraser, 2009], [Kuhlmann, 2010], [Ruetsche, 2011], and [Fraser, 2011]. Undermining this attitude is the aim of the following two subsections.…”

Section: A More Effective Realismmentioning

confidence: 80%

“…There have been arguments presented in its favor -in particular, arguments for ignoring EFTs in favor of attempting to extract ontological information by answering the nested counterfactual given above (for example, [Fraser, 2009], [Kuhlmann, 2010], [Fraser, 2011], or [Baker, 2013]). However, these arguments reveal a third vice of adhering to Standard Interpretive methodology: it can generate conclusions we have good reason to believe (at best) non sequiturs, and (at worst) false.…”

Section: Vices Of the Standard Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, these arguments reveal a third vice of adhering to Standard Interpretive methodology: it can generate conclusions we have good reason to believe (at best) non sequiturs, and (at worst) false. As one example, consider the argument in [Fraser, 2009] that the lack of a rigorous mathematical model of quantum field 11 By "rigorous mathematical model" I mean a model that satisfies the Wightman axioms (or some similar set of axioms). In the case of theories which are not asymptotically free (or asymptotically safe), there is positive reason to suspect that no rigorous mathematical model could ever be constructed (see e.g.…”

Section: Vices Of the Standard Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…24 If one doubts that this would be the result of a Standard Interpretation of the lattice EFT, I ask them to recall the conclusion of [Fraser, 2009] that an EFT whose breakdown was represented by a spatial lattice was committed to an ontology according to which physical space itself has a lattice structure.…”

Section: Approximate Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since a number of philosophers of physics view effective theories as an ad hoc solution to certain mathematical problems in quantum field theory, or merely as tools for extracting empirical predictions which convey no ontological guidance (for example, [Halvorson & Müger, 2006], [Fraser, 2009], [Kuhlmann, 2010], [Fraser, 2011], and [Butterfield & Bouatta, 2014, section 5.2]), I will argue for this position at some length in section 3.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Scientific Realism Made Effective

Williams

2019

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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I argue that a common philosophical approach to the interpretation of physical theories -particularly quantum field theories -has led philosophers astray. It has driven many to declare the quantum field theories employed by practicing physicists, so-called "effective field theories," to be unfit for philosophical interpretation. In particular, such theories have been deemed unable to support a realist interpretation. I argue that these claims are mistaken: attending to the manner in which these theories are employed in physical practice, I show that interpreting effective field theories yields a robust foundation for a more refined approach to scientific realism in the context of quantum field theory. The paper concludes by briefly sketching some general morals for interpretive practice in the philosophy of physics.

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Section: A More Effective Realismmentioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Vices Of the Standard Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Vices Of the Standard Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Approximate Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Scientific Realism Made Effective

Williams

2019

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Toppling the Pyramids: Physics Without Physical State Monism

Simpson

Horsley

2022

Synthese Library

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In this paper, we challenge a wide-spread assumption among philosophers that contemporary physics supports physical state monism. This is the claim that the causal powers of a system supervene upon the ‘lower-level’ laws and the lower-level state of the cosmos (as represented by our ‘best physics’). On this view, it makes sense to ignore a macroscopic system’s higher-level properties in determining its causal powers, since any higher-level powers are merely artifacts of our special interests. We argue that this assumption is common both to microphysicalism, which carves the cosmos into a set of microscopic constituents, and priority monism, which posits a single cosmic substance, but is incompatible with any form of physical pluralism that attributes irreducibly higher-level powers to entities of intermediate scales. We consider a number of case studies in contemporary physics which fail to support the thesis of state monism. We argue that the causal powers of many systems are (determined by) higher-level, macroscopic properties that are neither reducible nor weakly emergent, and that contemporary physics is compatible with some kind of pluralism that affirms that these entities are robustly real. A pluralist ontology is likely to have implications for discussions of free will and agency.

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Pragmatists and Purists on CPT Invariance in Relativistic Quantum Field Theories

Bain

2015

Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki

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Philosophers of physics are split on whether foundational issues in relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) should be framed within pragmatist approaches, which trade mathematical rigor for the ability to formulate non-trivial interacting models, or purist approaches, which trade the ability to formulate non-trivial interacting models for mathematical rigor. This essay addresses this debate by viewing it through the lens of the CPT theorem. I first consider two formulations of the CPT theorem, one purist and the other pragmatist, and extract from them a set of problems that clarifies the distinction between pragmatism and purity. I then apply this distinction to Greenberg's ([2002]) influential claim that the violation of CPT invariance in an interacting RQFT entails the violation of (restricted) Lorentz invariance. I show how this claim rests on an unsuccessful attempt to mediate between pragmatism and purity. I then evaluate another attempt at such mediation in the form of causal perturbation theory. This approach suggests that a focus on renormalized perturbation theory as a way of distinguishing pragmatists from purists may be misleading.

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Quantum Field Theory: Underdetermination, Inconsistency, and Idealization

Cited by 52 publications

References 34 publications

Scientific Realism Made Effective

Scientific Realism Made Effective

Toppling the Pyramids: Physics Without Physical State Monism

Pragmatists and Purists on CPT Invariance in Relativistic Quantum Field Theories

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