Toppling the Pyramids: Physics Without Physical State Monism

Abstract

In this paper, we challenge a wide-spread assumption among philosophers that contemporary physics supports physical state monism. This is the claim that the causal powers of a system supervene upon the ‘lower-level’ laws and the lower-level state of the cosmos (as represented by our ‘best physics’). On this view, it makes sense to ignore a macroscopic system’s higher-level properties in determining its causal powers, since any higher-level powers are merely artifacts of our special interests. We argue that this assumption is common both to microphysicalism, which carves the cosmos into a set of microscopic constituents, and priority monism, which posits a single cosmic substance, but is incompatible with any form of physical pluralism that attributes irreducibly higher-level powers to entities of intermediate scales. We consider a number of case studies in contemporary physics which fail to support the thesis of state monism. We argue that the causal powers of many systems are (determined by) higher-level, macroscopic properties that are neither reducible nor weakly emergent, and that contemporary physics is compatible with some kind of pluralism that affirms that these entities are robustly real. A pluralist ontology is likely to have implications for discussions of free will and agency.

Efficient, Formal, Material, and Final Causes in Biology and Technology

“…Consequently, these levels exist ontologically, not just epistemologically: we reliably determine this ontological nature by suitable experiments. This is supported by Simpson and Horsely (2022) [115], who state:…”

Hylomorphism

“…Is Causal Closure Scientifically Motivated? Kim's causal exclusion argument is a manifestation of a more entrenched orthodoxy of contemporary philosophy concerning the relation between physics and metaphysics, which rules against the existence of fundamental, macroscopic entities with higherlevel causal powers (Simpson, 2022;Simpson & Horsley, 2022). To begin with, it is widely supposed among analytic metaphysicians that our 'best physics' specifies a set of universal laws for the temporal development of matter, and that to offer an interpretation of a physical theory is to identify the set of worlds that are possible according to that theory.…”

“…For further philosophical discussion of this theory in relation to hylomorphism, seeSimpson (2020) andSimpson (2021b).46 For further discussion of how higher-level structure constrains lower-level physics, seeEllis (2021) andSimpson and Horsley (2022).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009026475 Published online by Cambridge University Press…”