Quantifier variance, semantic collapse, and “genuine” quantifiers

Warren, Jared

doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01685-2

Cited by 3 publications

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Intertranslatability and Ground-Equivalence

Lee

2024

Erkenn

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When are logical theories equivalent? I discuss the notion of ground-equivalence between logical theories, which can be useful for various theoretical reasons, e.g., we expect ground-equivalent theories to have the same ontological bearing. I consider whether intertranslatability is an adequate criterion for ground-equivalence. Jason Turner recently offered an argument that first-order logic and predicate functor logic are ground-equivalent in virtue of their intertranslatability. I examine his argument and show that this can be generalized to other intertranslatable logical theories, which supports the following: intertranslatability implies ground-equivalence. I also argue, however, that this ground-equivalence argument can be challenged as it faces a dilemma. The dilemma arises because the argument allows two distinct readings, the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ reading. I argue that the argument turns out to be unsuccessful in both readings. The upshot of this dilemma in both philosophy of logic and metaphysics is considered.

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Intertranslatability and Ground-Equivalence

Lee

2024

Erkenn

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The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism

Warren

2024

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind

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The central project of early modern philosophy was to build a theory of the world starting from the data of conscious sensory experience—sense data. Attempts to avoid this project usually argue that the very idea of sense data is confused. But the sense-data way of talking, the sense-data language, can be defended using ideas from contemporary metaontology. We can adopt a sense-data framework that vindicates the traditional claims of sense-data theories and leads to plausible theories of perception and color. Yet when we do, we face the traditional problem of external world skepticism, head-on. Fortunately, this challenge can be met: it is rational to believe in the external world as the best explanation of the many patterns in our sense-data. Here I argue for these points and end with a plea for analytic empiricism—a traditional sense-data version of empiricism that uses all of the tools of analytic philosophy.

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The New Collapse Argument against Quantifier Variance

Sider

2023

The Monist

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Quantifier variantists accept multiple alternative ontological languages in which quantifiers obey the usual inference rules despite having different meanings. But collapse arguments seem to show that these quantifiers would be provably equivalent to one another. Cian Dorr has pushed this discussion forward by formulating the collapse argument in terms of an algebra of meanings that are common amongst the languages. I attempt to show that quantifier variantists can respond. But an important distinction between types of quantifier variance emerges, between those in which quantifier meanings draw on a single objective backbone of “portions of reality,” and those (such as the type that is arguably associated with neo-Fregeanism) in which they do not.

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Quantifier variance, semantic collapse, and “genuine” quantifiers

Cited by 3 publications

References 15 publications

Intertranslatability and Ground-Equivalence

Intertranslatability and Ground-Equivalence

The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism

The New Collapse Argument against Quantifier Variance

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