The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism

Abstract

The central project of early modern philosophy was to build a theory of the world starting from the data of conscious sensory experience—sense data. Attempts to avoid this project usually argue that the very idea of sense data is confused. But the sense-data way of talking, the sense-data language, can be defended using ideas from contemporary metaontology. We can adopt a sense-data framework that vindicates the traditional claims of sense-data theories and leads to plausible theories of perception and color. Yet when we do, we face the traditional problem of external world skepticism, head-on. Fortunately, this challenge can be met: it is rational to believe in the external world as the best explanation of the many patterns in our sense-data. Here I argue for these points and end with a plea for analytic empiricism—a traditional sense-data version of empiricism that uses all of the tools of analytic philosophy.