Abstract:Variance and Realism is perhaps the most thorough example of a recent trend in metaphysics that steers away from a traditional substantive view while veering towards neo-Carnapian deflationism. Though this monograph contains interesting and valuable discussions on many topics within metametaphysics and metaontology, two main arguments are prominent. First, Hirsch details the thesis of 'quantifier variance' (QV), a position that argues that many (though not necessarily all) of our metaphysical disputes are, in … Show more
“…It is often said that Universalism posits bizarre fusions which common sense would reject. Here is a representative quote, from Hirsch (: 60): I understand perfectly well what it means to talk (in plain English) about such things as cars, bees, human beings, books, and the Eiffel Tower, or even to talk about such marginal things as noses and car‐hoods. But it's crazy to say (in plain English) that there exists something composed of my nose and the Eiffel Tower.…”
Section: Composition and Intuitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that respects folk intuitions, and have charged leading views with failing on this score. For instance, Hirsch (: 60) declares that ‘the linguistic evidence indicates that fluent speakers of English do not speak the mereologist's language.’ And Markosian (: 211) sets out from the claim that ‘no one has yet defended a view… consistent with standard, pre‐philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects.’…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Markosian : 224) offers an intuitive counterexample (his handshake case: §3.1). On Vitalism , Hirsch (: 67) says that it is hard ‘to keep a polite straight face’ at the idea that there are apple trees but no apples, while van Inwagen (: 103) claims no conflict with ‘Universal Belief.’…”
When does mereological composition occur? For instance, if a paper plate is positioned on a table between a plastic knife and a metal fork, does this scattered plurality of diverse objects make up a single composite object (a 'table setting') or not? Or if two people shake hands, does this connected plurality of similar objects make up a single composite object (shaped like a sculpture of two people shaking hands) or not? In general, when does a collection of things form a whole? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that respects folk intuitions, and have charged leading views with failing on this score. For instance, Hirsch (2002: 60) declares that 'the linguistic evidence indicates that fluent speakers of English do not speak the mereologist's language. ' And Markosian (1998: 211) sets out from the claim that 'no one has yet defended a view . . . consistent with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects. ' Yet there is widespread disagreement among metaphysicians as to what the folk intuit about mereological composition and why they do so, and no empirical discipline to the debate. We see this situation as an opportunity to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Accordingly we aim to discover when the folk tend to think that composition occurs, and why they do so. So our question is: when do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? That is, what is folk mereology, against which metaphysical accounts of real mereology might be measured?Our question-beyond whatever intrinsic interest it might possess-should be of interest to anyone interested in the psychological question of how humans conceptualize the world, and in the connected project of descriptive metaphysics. Whether our question is also relevant to prescriptive metaphysics is controversial. For those who take conformity with folk intuitions to be at least one desideratum of theory choice in prescriptive metaphysics, our question bears obvious relevance. But even those who would dismiss folk intuitions as irrelevant to real metaphysics (either because they deny that intuitions should play any role, or because they deny that the intuitions of the folk should play any role) may still want to know what they would dismiss. Indeed, it seems to us that understanding folk mereology is a precondition to considering whether it deserves to be taken seriously.C 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.238
“…It is often said that Universalism posits bizarre fusions which common sense would reject. Here is a representative quote, from Hirsch (: 60): I understand perfectly well what it means to talk (in plain English) about such things as cars, bees, human beings, books, and the Eiffel Tower, or even to talk about such marginal things as noses and car‐hoods. But it's crazy to say (in plain English) that there exists something composed of my nose and the Eiffel Tower.…”
Section: Composition and Intuitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that respects folk intuitions, and have charged leading views with failing on this score. For instance, Hirsch (: 60) declares that ‘the linguistic evidence indicates that fluent speakers of English do not speak the mereologist's language.’ And Markosian (: 211) sets out from the claim that ‘no one has yet defended a view… consistent with standard, pre‐philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects.’…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Markosian : 224) offers an intuitive counterexample (his handshake case: §3.1). On Vitalism , Hirsch (: 67) says that it is hard ‘to keep a polite straight face’ at the idea that there are apple trees but no apples, while van Inwagen (: 103) claims no conflict with ‘Universal Belief.’…”
When does mereological composition occur? For instance, if a paper plate is positioned on a table between a plastic knife and a metal fork, does this scattered plurality of diverse objects make up a single composite object (a 'table setting') or not? Or if two people shake hands, does this connected plurality of similar objects make up a single composite object (shaped like a sculpture of two people shaking hands) or not? In general, when does a collection of things form a whole? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that respects folk intuitions, and have charged leading views with failing on this score. For instance, Hirsch (2002: 60) declares that 'the linguistic evidence indicates that fluent speakers of English do not speak the mereologist's language. ' And Markosian (1998: 211) sets out from the claim that 'no one has yet defended a view . . . consistent with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects. ' Yet there is widespread disagreement among metaphysicians as to what the folk intuit about mereological composition and why they do so, and no empirical discipline to the debate. We see this situation as an opportunity to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Accordingly we aim to discover when the folk tend to think that composition occurs, and why they do so. So our question is: when do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? That is, what is folk mereology, against which metaphysical accounts of real mereology might be measured?Our question-beyond whatever intrinsic interest it might possess-should be of interest to anyone interested in the psychological question of how humans conceptualize the world, and in the connected project of descriptive metaphysics. Whether our question is also relevant to prescriptive metaphysics is controversial. For those who take conformity with folk intuitions to be at least one desideratum of theory choice in prescriptive metaphysics, our question bears obvious relevance. But even those who would dismiss folk intuitions as irrelevant to real metaphysics (either because they deny that intuitions should play any role, or because they deny that the intuitions of the folk should play any role) may still want to know what they would dismiss. Indeed, it seems to us that understanding folk mereology is a precondition to considering whether it deserves to be taken seriously.C 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.238
“…Deflationism includes semanticist views according to which ontological debates are ‘merely verbal’, verificationist positions according to which metaphysical claims are cognitively meaningless because they are unverifiable by any possible experience, and views according to which ontological questions do not have factual answers but rather are settled by merely pragmatic considerations about which language we should adopt for a given project. Similarly, pluralism includes both the ‘quantifier variance’ view of Eli Hirsch () and Hilary Putnam's ‘conceptual relativity’ () (in its first disjunct), as well as Huw Price's ‘functional pluralism’ (in its second disjunct). (Note that Price claims that his view is similar to another of Putnam's views, his ‘pragmatic pluralism’ (Price : 397; : 332 n 8).…”
Section: Meta‐ontological Deflationism and Pluralism Linguistic Frammentioning
In this paper, I critically discuss recent work on the role that the principle of tolerance plays in Rudolf Carnap's philosophy. Specifically, I consider how two prominent interpretations of Carnap's principle of tolerance can be used to argue for Carnap's anti‐metaphysical views. I then argue that there are serious problems with these arguments, and I diagnose those problems as resulting, in part, from a tension between competing goals of Carnap's philosophical project.
“… For views such as these see Hirsch (2002); Carnap (1932); Putnam (1987, 1988) and Yablo (1998). For an account of when theories are equivalent see Miller (2005).…”
Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are universals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This paper argues that we should be contingentists about monism and pluralism, and it defends contingentism against some necessitarian objections by offering an epistemology of contingent metaphysical claims.
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