Quangos in Germany?

Fiedler, Jürgen

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-27027-9_5

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Case Study Confirmation Of the Oversight Scores1

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2002

2004

Publication Types

Select...

Article1

Book1

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent2

Authors

Journals

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Highly centralized interest group organizations, particularly unions and employers' associations, figure prominently in German administrative politics (Jacobi, Keller, and Muller-Jentch 1998, 190-191). Private institutions often directly carry out public administrative activities (Fiedler 1999). At the same time the government's oversight role is limited.…”

Section: Case Study Confirmation Of the Oversight Scoresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies

Jensen¹

2004

Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way.

show abstract

Section: Case Study Confirmation Of the Oversight Scoresmentioning

confidence: 99%