Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies

Abstract

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way.

Implementing Europe

“…That is, they envisioned that both approaches to oversight could be used together even if one type, fire alarm, better served Congress's needs. Indeed, subsequent research has discovered that governments exhibit both approaches simultaneously (for example, McCubbins et al, 1989;Aberbach, 1990;Balla and Deering, 2001;Tallberg, 2003;Jensen, 2004).…”

“…Instead, they may choose to rely on fire alarm oversight approaches that, as I discuss in more detail below, reduce the costs associated with constant monitoring. Indeed, there is evidence that, among parliamentary governments, a single legislative veto player is a necessary condition for observing heavy reliance on police patrol oversight (Jensen, 2004).…”

Enforcing Social Europe through Labour Inspectorates: Changes in Capacity and Cooperation across Europe

“…The second criterion focuses in a more narrow sense on the capacity of an enforcement system to exert pressure. Political system literature has examined Enforcing Social Europe through Labour Inspectorates 809 how the probability of shirked obligations being actually discovered is related to control activities -proactive 'police patrols' constantly searching for misbehaviour, and reactive control visits following 'fire-alarm' complaints (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984: 168; with respect to labour inspection, see Jensen 2004). Changes in the number of labour inspectorates in a national system are important indicators of increases or decreases in the capacity to exert pressure in cases of non-compliance.…”

Making Rules about Rulemaking

“…The research on delegation, oversight, and bureaucratic autonomy in the American politics literature is rich and well known (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989, 1990; Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; Moe and Wilson 1994; Bawn 1995, 2001; McNollgast 1999; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001). There is also a growing literature on how these processes play out in parliamentary systems (Huber and Shipan 2002; Tsebelis 2002; Gilardi 2002; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2003; Jensen 2004; Jensen and Spoon Forthcoming), leading some scholars to analyze APAs comparatively (Baum 2007; de Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh 2004; Ginsburg 2002).…”

“…For example, both types of regimes can see reduced legislative productivity when conflict between veto players increases (Tsebelis 1995, 1997, 1999, 2002). Furthermore, veto players researchers have shown that increased conflict among veto players has consequences for administrative autonomy and policy implementation (Tsebelis 2002; Gilardi 2002; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Jensen 2004; Jensen and Spoon Forthcoming).…”