Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?

Dare, Tim; Kingsbury, Justine

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00082.x

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Since we regard those liberties and rights as important, we place a weighty burden on those who seek to have them removed or limited" (Dare and Kingsbury 2008, p. 507). 23 See notably Dare and Kingsbury (2008) on this line of reasoning. According to them, we ought to make a distinction between non-truth-directed and truth-directed activities.…”

Section: The Weak Burden Of Proof Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle

Daoust

2018

Topoi

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One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure (i.e., the cases in which epistemic peers are fully aware of each other's evidence and arguments), there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect to cases of disagreement under full disclosure, I will argue that there is a necessary connection (or a "bridge") between interpersonal permissiveness and its intrapersonal counterpart. Specifically, I claim that a plausible principle of correct argumentation supports such a bridge.

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Section: The Weak Burden Of Proof Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…SeeGodden (2008) on the problem of acceptance of starting points. 17 SeeDare and Kingsbury (2008),Gordon et al (2007),Hahn and Oaksford (2007) andWalton (2014) on this issue.…”

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confidence: 99%

Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle

Daoust

2018

Topoi

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“…In this respect one might draw a contrast between philosophy and science, on the one hand, and law, on the other. Law is openly and explicitly adversarial, and it has clear institutional structures recognizing and acknowledging the legitimacy of partisanship (Dare ), while philosophy and science are committed, both in theory and as a matter of institutional design, to an ideal of neutrality (Dare and Kingsbury ).…”

Section: Why Do Philosophers Misuse Science and Why Does It Matter?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophical Use and Misuse of Science

Kingsbury

Dare

2017

Metaphilosophy

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Science is our best way of finding out about the natural world, and philosophers who write about that world ought to be sensitive to the claims of our best science. There are obstacles, however, to outsiders using science well. We think philosophers are prone to misuse science: to give undue weight to results that are untested; to highlight favorable and ignore unfavorable data; to give illegitimate weight to the authority of science; to leap from scientific premises to philosophical conclusions without spelling out their relevance; to treat mere resonance between a scientific theory and a philosophical view as empirical evidence for the philosophical view. This article identifies and illustrates some of the ways in which philosophers misuse science, explains why these pitfalls are easy to fall into, and concludes with suggestions for avoiding them.

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“…See for instanceRescher 1977 (pp. 27-30),Lehrer 1971, Walton 1988, Räikkä 2005, Dare-Kingsbury 2008, no. 146 (agosto 2017)…”

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On Deontic Truth and Values

Moreso

2017

CRHF

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This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.

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Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?

Cited by 10 publications

References 6 publications

Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle

Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle

The Philosophical Use and Misuse of Science

On Deontic Truth and Values

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