Pursuit and inquisitive reasons

Fleisher, Will

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.04.009

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 113 publications

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“…As our subsequent philosophical working hypothesis, we'll adopt Peirce's "economic" account of pursuit-worthiness (McKaughan (2008) and Nyrup (2015); cf. Douglas (2013), Fleisher (2022), Lichtenstein (2021), and Šešelja and Straßer ( 2014)), a utility estimate, or cost/benefit analysis of the anticipated cognitive gains hoped for when investing in the idea-to-be-pursued: a theoretical ap-9 Needless to say, anomalies do haunt the ΛCDM model (see e.g. López-Corredoira (2017).…”

Section: Modified Gravitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Virtues of Pursuit-Worthy Speculation: The Promises of Cosmic Inflation

Wolf,

Duerr

2023

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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The paper argues that we ought to conceive of the Dark Energy problem-the question of how to account for observational data, naturally interpreted as accelerated expansion of the universe-as a crisis of underdetermined pursuitworthiness. Not only are the various approaches to the Dark Energy problem evidentially underdetermined; at present, no compelling reasons single out any of them as more likely to be true than the other. More vexingly for working scientists, none of the approaches stands out as uncontroversially preferable over its rivals in terms of its rationally warranted promise, i.e. the reasons to further work on, explore and develop it. We demonstrate this claim by applying a Peircean economic model of pursuit-worthiness in terms of a cognitive cost/benefit estimate-with the instantiation of theory virtues as key indicators of cognitive gains-to the four main Dark Energy proposals (the cosmological constant approach, modified gravity, quintessence, and inhomogeneous cosmologies). Our analysis yields that these approaches do not admit of an unambiguous, or uncontroversial, ranking with respect to which ansatz deserves distinguished attention and research efforts. The overall methodological counsel that our analysis underwrites recommends a pragmatic double research strategy forward: to encourage and foster theory pluralism and the search for tests-with the goal of enhancing the testability of the ΛCDM model and "testing it to destruction".

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Section: Modified Gravitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Virtues of Pursuit-Worthy Speculation: The Promises of Cosmic Inflation

Wolf,

Duerr

2023

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…In this paper, I will not be explicitly concerned with a variety of other normative terms such as virtue (Whitcomb et al, 2017), fittingness (McHugh and Way, 2016), reasons (Fleisher, 2022), blameworthiness (Brown, 2020, pursuitworthiness (Fleisher 2022, Seselja and Straßer 2014, Whitt 1992, objectivity (Longino, 1990), bias (Lee and Schunn, 2011;Gilovich and Griffin, 2002), or the aim or function of inquiry (Falbo, forthcoming;Friedman, ms;Kelp, 2021b). 3 My arguments may have direct implications for these terms if the terms are linked by bridge principles to claims about rationality or other normative categories.…”

Section: Clarifying the Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

There are no epistemic norms of inquiry

Thorstad

2022

Synthese

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Epistemic nihilism for inquiry is the claim that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry. Epistemic nihilism was once the received stance towards inquiry, and I argue that it should be taken seriously again. My argument is that the same considerations which led us away from epistemic nihilism in the case of belief not only cannot refute epistemic nihilism for inquiry, but in fact may well support it. These include the argument from non-existence that there are no non-epistemic reasons for belief; the linguistic argument that epistemic norms of belief are needed to capture the semantics of ordinary epistemic talk; and the argument from theoretical roles that epistemic norms are needed to play key theoretical roles for rational belief. I conclude by sketching an alternative Gibbardian picture on which norms of inquiry are all-things-considered norms governing action.

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“…34 34 For related views, see McWilliams (2023) for the view that there are epistemic duties to inquire. See Fleisher (2022) for the argument that there are zetetic reasons that are also epistemic. Harman's (1986) famous clutter avoidance principle is another candidate for a zetetic norm that may be epistemic.…”

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confidence: 99%

Norms of Inquiry

Haziza

2023

Philosophy Compass

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This article provides an overview of recent work on norms of inquiry. After some preliminaries about inquiry in §1, I discuss in §2 the ignorance norm for inquiry, presenting arguments for and against, as well as some alternatives. In §3, I consider its relation to the aim of inquiry. In §4, I discuss positive norms on inquiry: norms that require having rather than lacking certain states. Finally, in §5, I look at questions about the place of norms of inquiry within normative epistemology.

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Pursuit and inquisitive reasons

Cited by 9 publications

References 113 publications

The Virtues of Pursuit-Worthy Speculation: The Promises of Cosmic Inflation

The Virtues of Pursuit-Worthy Speculation: The Promises of Cosmic Inflation

There are no epistemic norms of inquiry

Norms of Inquiry

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