There are no epistemic norms of inquiry

Thorstad, David

doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03896-4

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 75 publications

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“…So the basic thought is that perhaps intrinsically indispensable projects that are not zetetically indispensable convey 9 See, e.g., Friedman 2020, Thorstad 2022, Flores and Woodard forthcoming, and Steglich-Petersen 2021 some other sort of justification such as ethical, pragmatic, or rational justification, but it is zetetically indispensable projects that convey epistemic justification.…”

Section: Zetetic Vindicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification

Kelley

2024

Philos Stud

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Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts.One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one's belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007Enoch's ( , 2011 deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying on an overly pragmatic account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. In particular, I argue that the sources of basic epistemic justification are those belief-forming methods which are indispensable for zetetically indispensable projects, that is, projects which are constitutive of being a successful inquirer for embodied, agential creatures like ourselves.

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Section: Zetetic Vindicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification

Kelley

2024

Philos Stud

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“…It is widely held that inquiry is (partially) constituted by a particular kind of interrogative attitude-a special way of suspending judgment, perhaps 23 -that amounts to being neutral with respect to a proposition, and that candidate zetetic norms (i.e., norms of inquiry) conflict with traditional epistemic norms. The so-called zetetic turn highlights this, as some of the main issues in that thriving literature concern how to think about the relations between zetetic norms and traditional, doxastic norms (see, e.g., Friedman, 2020;Thorstad, 2021Thorstad, , 2022.…”

Section: Incorporating Inquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

Agent-centered epistemic rationality

Gillespie

2023

Synthese

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It is a plausible and compelling theoretical assumption that epistemic rationality is just a matter of having doxastic attitudes that are the correct responses to one's epistemic reasons, or that all requirements of epistemic rationality reduce to requirements on doxastic attitudes. According to this idea, all instances of epistemic rationality are instances of rational belief. Call this assumption, and any theory working under it, belief-centered. In what follows, I argue that we should not accept beliefcentered theories of epistemic rationality. This is an argument in three acts. In the first, I present counterexamples that problematize the belief-centered assumption: cases whose protagonists (i) fail to meet any plausible requirements on belief but (ii) nevertheless appear epistemically rational. In the second act, I consider alternative explanations of the counterexamples, friendly to the belief-centered theorist, and find them wanting. In the third and final act, I show that there are significant theoretical benefits to acknowledging a distinct agent-centered dimension of epistemic rationality and sketch a candidate agent-centered approach: a view that grounds an agent's epistemic rationality in the possession of good epistemic policies. In the end, we see that a complete theory of epistemic rationality is as much of a theory of rational agents as it is of rational belief .

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“…One of the notable proponents spearheading this shift is Jane Friedman (2019a, Forthcoming (b)), who advocates for a departure from the doxastic orientation in favour of a zetetic perspective. According to Friedman (Forthcoming (b)), the subject of examination ought to be directed towards establishing the "norms for the entire process of inquiry, from the initial curiosity or formulation of a question to the settling or resolving of that question," i.e., norms that bear on the process from start to finish (Falbo, Forthcoming;Haziza, 2023;Thorstad, 2022). However, the literature often assumes, without discussion, that inquiry is a process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inquiry, Questions, and Actions

Guilielmo

2024

Dialogue

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This article aims to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of inquiry. I start with some common desiderata for any theory of inquiry. I then categorize inquiry as a structured process. By focusing on its essential components, I advance a new characterization of inquiry as a combination of questioning attitudes guiding actions. Finally, I turn to the recent objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry. I argue that inquiry is a structured process essentially constituted by questioning attitudes having two precise functional roles, initiating and guiding the deployment of cognitive capacities towards an epistemic goal.

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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry

Cited by 14 publications

References 75 publications

Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification

Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification

Agent-centered epistemic rationality

Inquiry, Questions, and Actions

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