Punitive but discerning:  Reputation can fuel ambiguously-deserved punishment, but does not erode sensitivity to nuance

Jordan, John; Kteily, Nour

doi:10.31234/osf.io/97nhj

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 60 publications

(80 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Prior research has begun to shed light on these discrepant findings by characterizing how beliefs about authorities' motivations affect how people change their beliefs about wrongness of the act (Tyler, 2006;Mulder, 2009;Verboon & van Dijke, 2011), and vice versa (J. Jordan & Kteily, 2020;Sarin, Ho, Martin, & Cushman, 2021). These studies typically focus on one component of these inferences at a time, and do not consider the interplay between them.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Consequently, many studies have documented the positive perceptions that observers have of people who are willing to punish: in both economic games and vignette studies, third-parties who choose to punish are judged as more trustworthy and less selfish (J. J. Jordan & Rand, 2020), more competent and and more moral (Gordon, Madden, & Lea, 2014;Gordon & Lea, 2016;Dhaliwal, Skarlicki, Hoegg, & Daniels, 2020;de Kwaadsteniet, Kiyonari, Molenmaker, & van Dijk, 2019;J. Jordan & Kteily, 2020;Tsai, Trinh, & Liu, 2022), and are more likely to be chosen as cooperation partners than people who choose not to punish the same transgression.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices

Radkani

Saxe

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Punishment is a cost imposed on a target, in response to an undesirable action. Yet choosing to punish also reveals information about the authority’s own motives and values. We propose that observers jointly infer the wrongness of the action and the authority’s motivations. Using hypothetical scenarios in unfamiliar societies, we experimentally manipulated observers’ prior beliefs and measured human observers’ inferences after observing punishment. These inferences were recapitulated in a formal model that inverts an intuitive causal model of authorities who make rational choices about punishment by weighing its costs and benefits (i.e. utilities). An essential component of this model, driving these inferences, is that legitimate authorities consider the utility of a proportional response to harmful actions, which depends on the balance between the wrongness of the act and the severity of the punishment.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices

Radkani

Saxe

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…"Good" group members punish wrongdoers and adopt worldviews that align with the group (Boggio et al, 2023;Henrich et al, 2006;Jordan & Kteily, 2020), which on the surface suggests normative influence-they meet the group's expectations and signal that they are a cooperative group member (Curry et al, 2019). In turn, group members who follow and enforce norms often gain social status within the group (Ellemers et al, 2008;Grubbs et al, 2019).…”

Section: Why Moral Expressions Are Influenced By the Social Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

What does my group consider moral?: How social influence shapes moral expressions

del Rosario,

Van Bavel,

West

2024

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although morality is often characterized as a set of stable values that are deeply held, we argue that moral expressions are highly malleable and sensitive to social norms. For instance, norms can either lead people to exaggerate their expressions of morality (such as on social media) or restrain them (such as in professional settings). In this paper, we discuss why moral expressions are subject to social influence by considering two goals that govern social influence: affiliation goals (the desire to affiliate with one’s group) and accuracy goals (the desire to be accurate in ambiguous situations). Different from other domains of social influence, we argue that moral expressions often satisfy both affiliation goals (“I want to fit in with the group”) and accuracy goals (“I want to do the right thing”). As such, the fundamental question governing moral expressions is: “what does my group consider moral?” We argue that this central consideration achieves both goals underlying social influence and drives moral expressions. We outline the ways in which social influence shapes moral expressions, from unconsciously copying others’ behavior to expressing outrage to gain status within the group. Finally, we describe when the same goals can result in different behaviors, highlighting how context-specific norms can encourage (or discourage) moral expressions. We explain how this framework will be helpful in understanding how identity, norms, and social contexts shape moral expressions.

show abstract

“…Such punishment can be socially rewarded ( 19 ) and signal trustworthiness ( 20 – 25 ) by conveying that the punisher is unlikely to themself transgress. Consequently, people punish more when their decisions are observable to others ( 26 , 27 ) and when punishment has greater signaling value ( 20 , 21 ).…”

Section: Does Reputation Drive People To Punish Without Looking?mentioning

confidence: 99%

How reputation does (and does not) drive people to punish without looking

Jordan¹,

Kteily

2023

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Punishing wrongdoers can confer reputational benefits, and people sometimes punish without careful consideration. But are these observations related? Does reputation drive people to people to “punish without looking”? And if so, is this because unquestioning punishment looks particularly virtuous? To investigate, we assigned “Actors” to decide whether to sign punitive petitions about politicized issues (“punishment”), after first deciding whether to read articles opposing these petitions (“looking”). To manipulate reputation, we matched Actors with copartisan “Evaluators,” varying whether Evaluators observed i) nothing about Actors’ behavior, ii) whether Actors punished, or iii) whether Actors punished and whether they looked. Across four studies of Americans (total n = 10,343), Evaluators rated Actors more positively, and financially rewarded them, if they chose to (vs. not to) punish. Correspondingly, making punishment observable to Evaluators (i.e., moving from our first to second condition) drove Actors to punish more overall. Furthermore, because some of these individuals did not look, making punishment observable increased rates of punishment without looking. Yet punishers who eschewed opposing perspectives did not appear particularly virtuous. In fact, Evaluators preferred Actors who punished with (vs. without) looking. Correspondingly, making looking observable (i.e., moving from our second to third condition) drove Actors to look more overall—and to punish without looking at comparable or diminished rates. We thus find that reputation can encourage reflexive punishment—but simply as a byproduct of generally encouraging punishment, and not as a specific reputational strategy. Indeed, rather than fueling unquestioning decisions, spotlighting punishers’ decision-making processes may encourage reflection.

show abstract

Punitive but discerning: Reputation can fuel ambiguously-deserved punishment, but does not erode sensitivity to nuance

Cited by 5 publications

References 60 publications

What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices

What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices

What does my group consider moral?: How social influence shapes moral expressions

How reputation does (and does not) drive people to punish without looking

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About