Across the cortical hierarchy, single neurons are characterized by differences in the extent to which they can sustain their firing rate over time (i.e., their "intrinsic timescale"). Previous studies have demonstrated that neurons in a given brain region mostly exhibit either short or long intrinsic timescales. In this study, we sought to identify populations of neurons that accumulate information over different timescales in the mouse brain and to characterize their functions in the context of a visual discrimination task. Thus, we separately examined the neural population dynamics of neurons with long or short intrinsic timescales across different brain regions. More specifically, we looked at the decoding performance of these neural populations aligned to different task variables (stimulus onset, movement). Taken together, our population-level findings support the hypothesis that long intrinsic timescale neurons encode abstract variables related to decision formation. Furthermore, we investigated whether there was a relationship between how well a single neuron represents the animal's choice or stimuli and their intrinsic timescale. We did not observe any significant relationship between the decoding of these task variables and a single neuron's intrinsic timescale. In summary, our findings support the idea that the long intrinsic timescale population of neurons, which appear at different levels of the cortical hierarchy, are primarily more involved in representing the decision variable.

The gradual accumulation of noisy evidence for or against options is the main step in the perceptual decision-making process. Using brain-wide electrophysiological recording in mice (Steinmetz et al., 2019), we examined neural correlates of evidence accumulation across multiple brain areas. We demonstrated that the neurons across the brain exhibited ramping-like firing rate activity that was modulated by the strength of evidence. These neurons had distinct properties in their intrinsic timescale, which were organized hierarchically across the brain. Our findings support the existence of evidence accumulation over multiple timescales. Besides variability across brain regions, a heterogeneity of intrinsic timescales was observed within each brain region as well. We demonstrated that this variability reflected the heterogeneity of microcircuit accumulation parameters, such that populations with longer timescales had higher recurrent excitation strength.

People facing material deprivation are more likely to turn to acquisitive crime. It is not clear why it makes sense for them to do so, given that apprehension and punishment may make their situation even worse. Recent theory suggests that people should be more willing to steal if they are on the wrong side of a ‘desperation threshold’; that is, a level of resources critical to wellbeing. Below such a threshold, people should pursue any risky behaviour that offers the possibility of a short route back above, and should be insensitive to the severity of possible punishments, since they have little left to lose. We developed a multi-round, multi-player economic game with a desperation threshold and the possibility of theft as well as cooperation. Across four experiments with 1000 UK and US adults, we showed that falling short of a desperation threshold increased stealing from other players, even when the payoff from stealing was negative on average. Within the microsocieties created in the game, the presence of more players with below-threshold resources produced low trust, driven by the experience of being stolen from. Contrary to predictions, our participants appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the severity of punishment for being caught trying to steal. Our results show, in an experimental microcosm, that some members of society falling short of a threshold of material desperation can have powerful social consequences.

People facing material deprivation are more likely to turn to acquisitive crime. It is not clear why it makes sense for them to do so, given that apprehension and punishment may make their situation even worse. A recent theoretical model explored the consequences of positing a desperation threshold, a critical level of resources below which it is disastrous to remain. The model showed that agents falling short of such a threshold should pursue risky behaviours, such as theft, that offer any possibility of a short route back above. The model made predictions about the effects of population inequality on crime and trust, and the sensitivity of crime to punishment severity. To test key predictions of the model, we developed a multi-round, multi-player economic game with a desperation threshold and the possibility of theft as well as legitimate alternatives for acquiring resources, i.e., cooperation, and an option of avoiding interaction altogether. Across four experiments with 1000 UK and US adults, we showed that falling short of a desperation threshold did indeed increase stealing from other players, even when the payoff from stealing is negative on average. Within the micro-societies created in the game, the presence of more players with below-threshold resources produced low cooperation and low trust, driven by the experience of being stolen from. Contrary to the model predictions, our participants appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the severity of punishment for being caught trying to steal. Our results show, in an experimental microcosm, that some members of society falling short of a threshold of material desperation can have powerful social consequences.

Punishment is a cost imposed on a target, in response to an undesirable action. Yet choosing to punish also reveals information about the authority’s own motives and values. We propose that observers jointly infer the wrongness of the action and the authority’s motivations. Using hypothetical scenarios in unfamiliar societies, we experimentally manipulated observers’ prior beliefs and measured human observers’ inferences after observing punishment. These inferences were recapitulated in a formal model that inverts an intuitive causal model of authorities who make rational choices about punishment by weighing its costs and benefits (i.e. utilities). An essential component of this model, driving these inferences, is that legitimate authorities consider the utility of a proportional response to harmful actions, which depends on the balance between the wrongness of the act and the severity of the punishment.

Group representations based on recursive utilities can be used to derive the same predictions as Pietraszewski in conflict situations. Additionally, these representations generalize to non-conflict situations, asymmetric relationships, and represent the stakes in a conflict. However, both proposals fail to represent asymmetries of power and responsibility and to account for generalizations from specific observed individuals to collections of non-observed individuals.

Actions that do not have instrumental goals can communicate social goals that are not rituals. Many non-instrumental actions such as bowing or kissing communicate a commitment to or roles in dyadic relationships. What is unclear is when people understand such actions in terms of ritual and when they understand them in terms of relationships. [commentary on Jagiello et al.: Tradition and invention forthcoming in BBS].

Actions that do not have instrumental goals can communicate social goals that are not rituals. Many non-instrumental actions such as bowing or kissing communicate a commitment to or roles in dyadic relationships. What is unclear is when people understand such actions in terms of ritual and when they understand them in terms of relationships.