2018
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3184836
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Public Statements of Good Conduct Promote Pro-Social Behavior

Abstract: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz … Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The A treatment dimension in our experiment relates closely to the large literature on communication in social dilemma games (Isaac and Walker, 1988;Miettinen and Suetens, 2008;Bochet and Putterman, 2009;Balliet, 2010;Koessler et al, 2018). The main finding of this literature is that pre-play communication facilitates cooperation (Bochet et al, 2006).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 74%
“…The A treatment dimension in our experiment relates closely to the large literature on communication in social dilemma games (Isaac and Walker, 1988;Miettinen and Suetens, 2008;Bochet and Putterman, 2009;Balliet, 2010;Koessler et al, 2018). The main finding of this literature is that pre-play communication facilitates cooperation (Bochet et al, 2006).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 74%
“…16 in the appendix). Previous research has shown that engaging individuals pro-actively in the act of promise-making induced a higher commitment to the promised behaviour (Kiesler 1971). After all group members made their decision about the promise, feedback was provided on which group members made the promise.…”
Section: Ratificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In our experiment, the Ratification element only became active when the majority of the group members voted previously for the socially optimal strategy and naturally could only be implemented in combination with the other three elements. The implementation followed a mechanism developed by Koessler et al (2018): First, subjects were asked whether they wanted to promise that they will follow the socially optimal strategy in all rounds of the following game. If they agreed, they had to key-in the following statement: "I promise to contribute 20 points in all subsequent rounds."…”
Section: Ratificationmentioning
confidence: 99%