Nudging cooperation in public goods provision

Abstract

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Delegation and Overhead Aversion with Multiple Threshold Public Goods

“…Galbiati and Vertova (2014) further show that the channel through which the obligation (with nondeterring incentives) works is by affecting people's beliefs about others' contributions. Barron and Nurminen (2020) present suggestive evidence to show that this effect is driven by the presence of a focal point that helps conditional cooperators coordinate their contributions. Thus, the theoretically irrelevant 20% rule could shift the intermediary's preferences by expressing a social norm that if internalized would provide an opportunity for a "Pareto self-improvement" in which the intermediary might be willing to contribute more than the required minimum to the public goods.…”

Nudges and peak pricing: A common pool resource energy conservation experiment

“…Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) nd that suggested play works only under the addition of an element of moral suasion; the idea in a public good game that increasing your contribution to the maximum amount benets everyone. Barron and Nurminen (2020) reproduce this result in a public good game in which the experimenter states a minimum contribution level which they view as "good" -moral suasion -which leads to contributions 40% above those of the baseline subjects.…”

Fostering Participation in Digital Public Health Interventions: The Case of Digital Contact Tracing

“…They show that this moral nudge significantly increases prosocial and cooperative behavior and that this effect also spills over to other contexts. Barron & Nurminen (2020) give a share of the participants in their public goods game the information that a certain level of contribution is viewed as 'good' or desirable from a social perspective. Providing such a reference point to individuals has a significant positive effect on their contributions to the public good.…”