Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany

Braendle, Thomas; Stutzer, Alois

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9563-3

Cited by 27 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 34 publications

(31 reference statements)

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“…To allow a consistent estimation, we instrument the fraction of public servants with the respective institutional determinants that are not themselves explanatory variables for parliamentary oversight. These instruments are taken form Braendle and Stutzer (2010). Braendle and Stutzer (2010) analyze the selection effects of institutional restrictions and privileges that apply only to public servants elected to parliament.…”

Section: Instrumental Variable Estimationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These instruments are taken form Braendle and Stutzer (2010). Braendle and Stutzer (2010) analyze the selection effects of institutional restrictions and privileges that apply only to public servants elected to parliament. Examples are the varying degrees in the strictness of incompatibility rules or privileges, such as special pension benefits, automatic promotion and the abeyance compensation for being put on leave.…”

Section: Instrumental Variable Estimationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The coefficients of the percentage change for all dummy variables are computed using the post estimation Stata command "logdummy". Table 2 continued on next page -- Table 2 Instruments for the fraction of public servants are taken from Braendle and Stutzer (2010). Standard errors in parentheses.…”

Section: Figures and Tablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sources: For the dependent variables, see Kalke and Raschke (2004), Mielke and Reutter (2004), Raschke and Kalke (1994), Reutter (2008), Schäfer (2005), and various parliamentary handbooks and parliamentary documentation systems. For the independent variables, see Braendle and Stutzer (2010) for the fraction of public servants, Massicotte (2003) for the coding of the variable electoral system, and Manow and Wettengel (2006) as well as the German electoral office (Bundeswahlleiter ) for the coding of the form of government. For the coding of the variable capturing major alternation in government see Manow and Wettengel (2006) and the German electoral office (Bundeswahlleiter ).…”

Section: Figures and Tablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight

Braendle

Stutzer

2012

Econ Gov

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In this paper, we propose a framework to integrate the identity of legislators in a politicoeconomic analysis of parliamentary oversight. Legislators decide about the effort they invest in oversight activities depending on their individual control costs and the level of electoral competition. We focus on public servants elected to parliament who face a conflict of interests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage. If held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes. For German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations. This result holds when instrumenting the fraction of public servants in parliament with its institutional determinants. Moreover, a mixed-member electoral system as well as a tighter race between the two biggest parties is related to more, a larger number of parties in parliament to less minor interpellations.

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Section: Instrumental Variable Estimationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Instrumental Variable Estimationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Figures and Tablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Figures and Tablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight

Braendle

Stutzer

2012

Econ Gov

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“…In an earlier study closely linked to the current analysis, Braendle and Stutzer (2010a) investigate the representation of public servants in German state parliaments. Using time-series crosssectional analysis, they found that institutional restrictions in terms of incompatibility rules substantially reduce the selection of public servants into parliament and that institutionally granted privileges increase the fraction of public servants.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selection of public servants into politics

Braendle

Stutzer

2016

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns about conflicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these rules affect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public servants in 71 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there are 7 percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict regime is in force. Supplementary evidence shows that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption as well as the absence of corruption.

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