Public misconceptions about dyslexia: The role of intuitive psychology

Abstract

Despite advances in its scientific understanding, dyslexia is still associated with rampant public misconceptions. Here, we trace these misconceptions to the interaction between two intuitive psychological principles: Dualism and Essentialism. We hypothesize that people essentialize dyslexia symptoms that they anchor in the body. Experiment 1 shows that, when dyslexia is associated with visual confusions (b/d reversals)—symptoms that are naturally viewed as embodied (in the eyes), laypeople consider dyslexia as more severe, immutable, biological, and heritable, compared to when dyslexia is linked to difficulties with phonological decoding (a symptom seen as less strongly embodied). Experiments 2–3 show that the embodiment of symptoms plays a causal role in promoting essentialist thinking. Experiment 2 shows that, when participants are provided evidence that the symptoms of dyslexia are embodied (i.e., they “show up” in a brain scan), people are more likely to consider dyslexia as heritable compared to when the same symptoms are diagnosed behaviorally (without any explicit evidence for the body). Finally, Experiment 3 shows that reasoning about the severity of dyslexia symptoms can be modulated by manipulating people’s attitudes about the mind/body links, generally. These results show how public attitudes towards psychological disorders arise from the very principles that make the mind tick.

The illusion of the mind–body divide is attenuated in males

“…Past research has shown that innateness intuitions are indeed linked to embodiment intuitions. When presented with evidence that a psychological trait is embodied, participants are more likely to consider that trait as innate (compared to when told that the same trait has no known anchoring in the body) 8 , 10 , 72 .…”

“…This prediction is borne out by two pieces of evidence. First, when neurotypical participants are primed to consider bodies and minds alike (i.e., towards Physicalism), their empiricist stance declines (temporarily) 10 , 72 . The second piece of evidence comes from people with autism—a condition that is known to attenuate ToM 39 , 43 – 53 .…”

“…Experiment 3 explores the putative effect of Dualism on another aspect of reasoning—innateness intuitions. Past research suggests that Dualism promotes Empiricism—the belief that psychological traits cannot be innate (due to a Dualism–Essentialism interaction, discussed next) 8 , 10 , 72 , 73 . If males are less Dualist, and Dualism typically begets Empiricism, then males ought to further show weaker Empiricism (see Fig.…”

Biology, society, or choice: How do non-experts interpret explanations of behaviour?

“…For example, highlighting social-structural causes of poverty as opposed to individual effort increases support for redistributive policies (Piff et al, 2020). Moreover, merely making the biological level of explanation salient makes people assume that a behaviour is more inherent, less malleable, and less under a person's control (Berent & Platt, 2021a, 2021bHaslam & Kvaale, 2015). Thus, non-expert cognition seems to have the following features: there are several discrete types of possible cause of a human outcome; malleability and the locus of responsibility depend on which type of cause is operation; and to change the outcome, you have to intervene in way that matches the type of cause.…”

“…If these three clusters stem from different core cognitive domains (intuitive biology, intuitive psychology and intuitive sociology), then people should make different patterns of automatic inference from explanations in each of the clusters. For example, when intuitive biology is activated by referring to a bodily basis, psychological disorders are assumed to be immutable and transmissible to family members (Berent & Platt, 2021b, 2021aHaslam & Kvaale, 2015). Presumably this is because intuitive biology embodies the automatic assumption that traits are due to an inner essence that is passed on through reproduction (Atran, 1998).…”