How does repeated or chronic childhood adversity shape social and cognitive abilities? According to the prevailing deficit model, children from high-stress backgrounds are at risk for impairments in learning and behavior, and the intervention goal is to prevent, reduce, or repair the damage. Missing from this deficit approach is an attempt to leverage the unique strengths and abilities that develop in response to high-stress environments. Evolutionary-developmental models emphasize the coherent, functional changes that occur in response to stress over the life course. Research in birds, rodents, and humans suggests that developmental exposures to stress can improve forms of attention, perception, learning, memory, and problem solving that are ecologically relevant in harsh-unpredictable environments (as per the specialization hypothesis). Many of these skills and abilities, moreover, are primarily manifest in currently stressful contexts where they would provide the greatest fitness-relevant advantages (as per the sensitization hypothesis). This perspective supports an alternative adaptation-based approach to resilience that converges on a central question: "What are the attention, learning, memory, problem-solving, and decision-making strategies that are enhanced through exposures to childhood adversity?" At an applied level, this approach focuses on how we can work with, rather than against, these strengths to promote success in education, employment, and civic life.

Human infants face the formidable challenge of learning the structure of their social environment. Previous research indicates that infants have early-developing representations of intentional agents, and of cooperative social interactions, that help meet that challenge. Here we report five studies with 144 infant participants showing that 10-to 13-month-old, but not 8-month-old, infants recognize when two novel agents have conflicting goals, and that they use the agents’ relative size to predict the outcome of the very first dominance contests between them. These results suggest that preverbal infants mentally represent social dominance and use a cue that covaries with it phylogenetically, and marks it metaphorically across human cultures and languages, to predict which of two agents is likely to prevail in a conflict of goals.

The direction of an association at the population-level may be reversed within the subgroups comprising that population—a striking observation called Simpson's paradox. When facing this pattern, psychologists often view it as anomalous. Here, we argue that Simpson's paradox is more common than conventionally thought, and typically results in incorrect interpretations—potentially with harmful consequences. We support this claim by reviewing results from cognitive neuroscience, behavior genetics, clinical psychology, personality psychology, educational psychology, intelligence research, and simulation studies. We show that Simpson's paradox is most likely to occur when inferences are drawn across different levels of explanation (e.g., from populations to subgroups, or subgroups to individuals). We propose a set of statistical markers indicative of the paradox, and offer psychometric solutions for dealing with the paradox when encountered—including a toolbox in R for detecting Simpson's paradox. We show that explicit modeling of situations in which the paradox might occur not only prevents incorrect interpretations of data, but also results in a deeper understanding of what data tell us about the world.

Many studies in humans have shown that adverse experience in early life is associated with accelerated reproductive timing, and there is comparative evidence for similar effects in other animals. There are two different classes of adaptive explanation for associations between early-life adversity and accelerated reproduction, both based on the idea of predictive adaptive responses (PARs). According to external PAR hypotheses, early-life adversity provides a 'weather forecast' of the environmental conditions into which the individual will mature, and it is adaptive for the individual to develop an appropriate phenotype for this anticipated environment. In internal PAR hypotheses, early-life adversity has a lasting negative impact on the individual's somatic state, such that her health is likely to fail more rapidly as she gets older, and there is an advantage to adjusting her reproductive schedule accordingly. We use a model of fluctuating environments to derive evolveability conditions for acceleration of reproductive timing in response to early-life adversity in a long-lived organism. For acceleration to evolve via the external PAR process, early-life cues must have a high degree of validity and the level of annual autocorrelation in the individual's environment must be almost perfect. For acceleration to evolve via the internal PAR process requires that early-life experience must determine a significant fraction of the variance in survival prospects in adulthood. The two processes are not mutually exclusive, and mechanisms for calibrating reproductive timing on the basis of early experience could evolve through a combination of the predictive value of early-life adversity for the later environment and its negative impact on somatic state.

A predominant view in psychology is that early psychosocial adversity (e.g., abuse) impairs cognition, because children from stressful backgrounds (e.g., violent households) score lower on standard tests of intelligence, language, memory, inhibition, and other abilities. However, recent studies indicate that these people may exhibit improved detection, learning, and memory on tasks involving stimuli that are ecologically relevant to them (e.g., dangers), compared with safely nurtured peers. These findings contradict the view that cognition of stressed people is generally impaired; they suggest, rather, that these people’s minds are developmentally specialized toward local environmental conditions. Here, we review recent research supporting this hypothesis. In addition, we propose that novel studies should examine whether stressed children show not only improved detection but also improved memory and reasoning on tasks involving stimuli that are ecologically relevant to them. Finally, we discuss clinical implications of switching from conceptualizing stressed minds as “adapted” rather than “impaired.”

Development in many organisms appears to show evidence of sensitive windows—periods or stages in ontogeny in which individual experience has a particularly strong influence on the phenotype (compared to other periods or stages). Despite great interest in sensitive windows from both fundamental and applied perspectives, the functional (adaptive) reasons why they have evolved are unclear. Here we outline a conceptual framework for understanding when natural selection should favour changes in plasticity across development. Our approach builds on previous theory on the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, which relates individual and population differences in plasticity to two factors: the degree of uncertainty about the environmental conditions and the extent to which experiences during development (‘cues’) provide information about those conditions. We argue that systematic variation in these two factors often occurs within the lifetime of a single individual, which will select for developmental changes in plasticity. Of central importance is how informational properties of the environment interact with the life history of the organism. Phenotypes may be more or less sensitive to environmental cues at different points in development because of systematic changes in (i) the frequency of cues, (ii) the informativeness of cues, (iii) the fitness benefits of information and/or (iv) the constraints on plasticity. In relatively stable environments, a sensible null expectation is that plasticity will gradually decline with age as the developing individual gathers information. We review recent models on the evolution of developmental changes in plasticity and explain how they fit into our conceptual framework. Our aim is to encourage an adaptive perspective on sensitive windows in development.

Publisher's copyright statement:Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. 24Queen's Campus Stockton, University Boulevard, Thornaby, Stockton-on-Tees, TS17 6BH, UK. Children, particularly girls, who experience early familial adversity tend to go 32 on to reach sexual maturity relatively early. This feature of adolescent development is 33 believed to be an evolved strategy that arose because individuals with genes that 34 caused them to mature relatively early under certain conditions left behind more 35 descendants than those who did not. However, although much has been done to 36 uncover the psychological and physiological mechanisms underlying this process, less 37 attention has been paid to the evolutionary reasons behind why it might be 38 advantageous. It has previously been suggested that this strategy evolved because 39 early familial adversity accurately indicated later environmental adversity, under 40 which conditions early reproduction would likely maximize evolutionary fitness. In 41 this paper we contrast this 'external prediction' model with an alternative explanation, 42 which builds upon the existing explanation and is mutually compatible with it, but 43 which is distinct from it. We argue that accelerated development is advantageous 44 because early adversity detrimentally affects the individual's body, increasing later 45 morbidity and mortality; individuals may adapt to this internal setback by accelerating 46 their development. Unlike the external prediction model, this 'internal prediction' 47 relies not upon temporal environmental continuity, but on long-term effects of early 48 circumstances on the body. well-known among these findings, in social contexts where nuclear families 57 predominate, menarche occurs at a younger age among girls with 'absent' fathers (B. 58Jones, Leeton, McLeod, & Wood, 1972;Moffitt, Caspi, Belsky, & Silva, 1992; Tither 59 & Ellis, 2008). Studies that investigate the apparent effects of family circumstances in 60 detail have revealed that early menarche occurs in girls with less affectionate and 61 cohesive parent-child relationships (Chisholm, Quinlivan, Petersen, & Coall, 2005; 62 Graber, Brooks-Gunn, & Warren, 1995;Steinberg, 1988), those who experience 63 greater parent-child conflict (Graber et al., 1995;Kim & Smith, 1998; Mezzich et al., 64 1997), or who are exposed to greater parent-parent conflict (Chisholm et al., 2005; 65 Ellis & Garber, 2000;Ellis, McFadyen-Ketchum, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999), and 66 those who experi...

Development is typically a constructive process, in which phenotypes incrementally adapt to local ecologies. Here, we present a novel model in which natural selection shapes developmental systems based on the evolutionary ecology, and these systems adaptively guide phenotypic development. We assume that phenotypic construction is incremental and trades off with sampling cues to the environmental state. We computed the optimal developmental programmes across a range of evolutionary ecological conditions. Using these programmes, we simulated distributions of mature phenotypes. Our results show that organisms sample the environment most extensively when cues are moderately, not highly, informative. When the developmental programme relies heavily on sampling, individuals transition from sampling to specialization at different times in ontogeny, depending on the consistency of their sampled cue set; this finding suggests that stochastic sampling may result in individual differences in plasticity itself. In addition, we find that different selection pressures may favour similar developmental mechanisms, and that organisms may incorrectly calibrate development despite stable ontogenetic environments. We hope our model will stimulate adaptationist research on the constructive processes guiding development.