Psychopathy and internalism

Kumar, Victor

doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1165571

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…conception of morality (Vargas and Nichols 2007). Other critics, who have meta-ethical questions about the nature of morality and the value of the moral/conventional paradigm as a measure of moral knowledge, prefer to interpret psychopaths as capable of accessing moral concepts using non-emotional routes ignored by the task (Greenspan 2003;Kumar 2016;Maibom 2005Maibom , 2010b. I believe we can make progress by sidestepping these debates about the nature of moral concepts and moral knowledge.…”

Section: Psychopathymentioning

confidence: 99%

Shame, Embarrassment, and the Subjectivity Requirement

Ramirez

2018

EuJAP

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Reactive theories of responsibility see moral accountability as grounded on the capacity for feeling reactive-attitudes. I respond to a recent argument gaining ground in this tradition that excludes psychopaths from accountability. The argument relies on what Paul Russell has called the 'subjectivity requirement'. On this view, the capacity to feel and direct reactive-attitudes at oneself is a necessary condition for responsibility. I argue that even if moral attitudes like guilt are impossible for psychopaths to deploy, that psychopaths, especially the "successful" and "secondary" subtypes of psychopathy, can satisfy the subjectivity requirement with regard to shame. I appeal to evidence that embarrassment and shame are grounded on the same affective process and data that psychopathic judgments about embarrassment are neurotypical. If I am right, then psychopaths ought to be open to shame-based forms of accountability including shame punishments. I conclude by considering why psychopaths rarely self-report shame. I argue that lacking a capacity to see oneself as flawed is a different sort of failure than lacking the capacity to feel.

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Section: Psychopathymentioning

confidence: 99%

Shame, Embarrassment, and the Subjectivity Requirement

Ramirez

2018

EuJAP

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“…We contend that common definitions of moral judgment do not sufficiently distinguish a 'moral' judgment from other judgments and/or judgment simpliciter. We advance this proposition by first pointing out that the term 'judgement' is itself lacking a proper definition, whereafter we critically survey three possible accounts of 'moral' judgment: (1) we consider the common position that moral judgment is distinguished from other judgment types by its content; (2) we consider the possibility that moral judgments are distinguished from other judgments by brain processes; and lastly (3) we consider one of the few explicit and contemporary defenses of the position that moral judgments constitute a distinctive kind (i.e., Kumar 2015;2016a;2016b). We show that all three proposals fail to meaningfully differentiate 'moral' judgments from other judgment types.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are there “Moral” Judgments?

Sackris

Larsen

2023

EuJAP

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Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment.

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“…Moreover, psychopathy has figured prominently in many recent philosophical and applied debates. For instance, some authors have argued that the existence of psychopaths might have implications for the nature of moral judgement and other issues in metaethics (Prinz 2006;Sinnott-Armstrong 2014;Kumar 2016). As for the practical repercussions, some authors have argued that scientific research warrants diminished legal or moral accountability for individuals falling under the category of psychopathy (Malatesti and McMillan 2010; see also Jalava and Griffiths 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Kindness of Psychopaths

Brzović

Jurjako

Šustar

2017

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We frame the issue in terms of the question whether 'psychopathy' designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine three ways of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualised. We argue that while a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and theoretical advancements, we also emphasise its role in clinical and forensic research, which makes it an important pragmatic kind.

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Psychopathy and internalism

Cited by 11 publications

References 74 publications

Shame, Embarrassment, and the Subjectivity Requirement

Shame, Embarrassment, and the Subjectivity Requirement

Are there “Moral” Judgments?

The Kindness of Psychopaths

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