Psychological Essentialism at the Explicit and Implicit Levels: The Unique Status of Social Categories

Karasawa, Minoru; Asai, Nobuyuki; Hioki, Koichi

doi:10.1111/jpr.12246

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 40 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Although essentialist beliefs about social categories have been demonstrated in a variety of cultures (22,23,24,12,25,26,27), there has been almost no comparative work on cultural differences in social category essentialism. One exception is a small number of studies on cross cultural differences in the development of essentialist beliefs (28,29,24).…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, the past literature on social essentialism is largely concentrated on western samples, the majority of which come from European, American and Australian populations. Given the limited evidence from eastern societies (27), the current study contributes to our understanding of social essentialist thinking more broadly by examining the phenomenon comparatively in China and the US. This allows us to examine essentialist thinking about social categories in two cultures that differ more than those examined in Study 1.…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The analyses yielded the same 2-factor solution separately in the US and China, with the three naturalness items loading onto one factor and the three cohesiveness items loading onto the other factor (see Table 2). This is especially notable since we used a truncated version of the measure, employing six of the original nine scales (27). To illustrate where different social dimensions fall relative to each other for participants in the US and China, we again computed standardized scores for all categories on both essentialism components, averaged those by social dimension (e.g., race, religion), and graphed these on a naturalness x cohesiveness scatterplot (see Fig.…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A two-component framework captures cross-cultural similarities and differences in essentialist thinking about social categories

Coley¹,

Feeney²,

Xu³

et al. 2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social essentialism is the intuitive assumption that members of social categories share underlying properties that determine category membership and cause observable regularities. We investigate cultural differences in social essentialism in the USA, Northern Ireland, and China. In Study 1, 106 undergraduates from the US and Northern Ireland rated 44 social categories on 9 scales representing distinct aspects of social essentialism. In Study 2, 157 undergraduates from the US and China rated 31 social categories on 6 scales. Results showed that a single two-component framework—describing variability in social categories with respect to perceived naturalness (objectivity, immutability) and cohesiveness (homogeneity, informativeness)—explained representations of social categories in all three cultures. Differences emerged as well; on average, American participants rated social categories as more natural and less cohesive than Northern Irish or Chinese participants. Moreover, specific social dimensions were seen as more natural in cultures where those dimensions had particular cultural salience (religion in Northern Ireland, home region in China). Together, these findings demonstrate cross-cultural similarities (a common two- component framework for representing social kinds, a common way to essentialize historically salient social dimensions) and differences (in the general extent to which social categories were perceived to be natural and cohesive) across disparate cultural groups.

show abstract

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A two-component framework captures cross-cultural similarities and differences in essentialist thinking about social categories

Coley¹,

Feeney²,

Xu³

et al. 2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The first thing to note about the studies mentioned above is that they surveyed participants on their explicit, self-reported, beliefs about race. Various studies have found that when it comes to implicit attitudes about race (and other social categories), people tend to be more essentialist in their thinking (e.g., see Chas et al, 2018;Goff et al, 2008;Karasawa et al, 2019).…”

Section: Explaining Variation In Essentialist Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Roots of Racial Categorization

Phillips

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I examine the origins of ordinary racial thinking. In doing so, I argue against the thesis that it is the byproduct of a unique module (e.g. a folk-biology module). Instead, I defend a pluralistic thesis according to which different forms of racial thinking are driven by distinct mechanisms, each with their own etiology. I begin with the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race. I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have an important, albeit delimited, role to play in sustaining this belief. I then argue that essentialist beliefs about race are driven by some of the mechanisms responsible for "entitativity perception": the tendency to perceive some aggregates of people as more genuine groups than others. Finally, I argue that coalitional thinking about race is driven by a distinctive form of entitativity perception. However, I suggest that more data is needed to determine the prevalence of this form of racial thinking. I conclude by discussing potential ways in which this pluralistic approach will advance our understanding of racial prejudice, racial stereotyping, and the ethics of racial categorization. Face recognition and the visual markers of raceOne belief that is central to folk thinking about race is that the members of different racial groups are distinguished by bodily features, such as skin color and facial physiognomy (see Glasgow, 2009, 69, 119;Hardimon, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996, 155). The centrality of this belief is reflected in the fact that some individuals are seen as more typical-looking for a given racial group than others (Maddox, 2004, p. 383). For example, Black men are stereotypically thought to have "dark skin tone, broad noses, full lips, and tightly curled hair" (Maddox & Perry, 2018, p. 58).Research has also shown that when a member of a racial group is seen as highly typical for that group, they are subject to more prejudice and stereotyping than other members. Maddox calls this racial phenotypicality bias (Maddox, 2004; see also Maddox & Perry, 2018).The consensus among biologists and race scholars is that there is no non-arbitrary way to sort people according to the visible markers of race (e.g., see Zack, 2002, p. 43). Nonetheless, the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race is still widespread among the folk. Where does this belief come from? In what follows, I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have a key role to play.

show abstract

“…Karasawa, Asai, and Hioki's () study, entitled “Psychological Essentialism at the Explicit and Implicit Levels: The Unique Status of Social Categories,” is about psychological essentialism. This is the idea that we humans tend to perceive commonalities among category members, such that infants categorize living things (e.g., dogs and fish) together and differentiate artifacts (e.g., chairs and buildings).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%